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Abstract
This dissertation explores applying nonparametric and semiparametric meth-
ods to recover latent characteristics in various settings. The first chapter studies
an auction market where latent effort is selected by the bidders. Recently, states
have experimented with offering nonstandard contracts through procurement
auctions in an attempt to reduce long-term costs on projects. With no frame-
work in place to study the effects of these of changes, these innovative projects
lack the rigorous analysis needed to see widespread implementation. The effects
on effort, immediate costs, and potential future costs are all relevant to policy
debates about the use of nonstandard contracts. This paper formally addresses
the use of nonstandard warranty contracts in procurement auctions by build-
ing latent effort choice into an auction model. Taking my model to data from
Michigan, I find that warranty auctions encourage roughly 30% of the lowest
cost firms to undertake higher effort work in order to reduce future expected
costs from repair. Although implementing these contracts across all auctions
would have cost an additional $68.7 million in immediate costs over my sample
period, Michigan would have saved roughly $3 million annually in the long-run
due to the elimination of future repair work by the state.
The second chapter employs panel data to recover latent behavior related
to the health and drug use of survey respondents. The misreporting problem of
drug use in self-reported surveys can severely affect the validity of estimation re-
sults in empirical work. In this paper we use an eigen-decomposition method to
nonparametrically estimate the misclassification errors under various assump-
tions and settings. We use the longitudinal data of NLSY97 and focus on the
ii
years from 2005 to 2009, when the cohort is aged in their mid-20s. We find that
the overall proportion of participants who actually use marijuana is higher than
the reported proportion. Moreover, participants inclination to misreport their
drug use status is related to their current and previous actual drug use as well
as their habit for misreporting in surveys. In general, males are more likely to
underreport their drug use than females.
The third chapter builds on the recent developments of nonparametric meth-
ods for measuring asset price volatility that allow researchers to distinguish
between daily volatility arising from discrete price changes (jumps) and that
arising from continuous price changes. We investigate the asymmetric effects of
signed jumps and semivariance on future volatility in the US Treasury futures
market. We compare and contrast our findings to the empirical work in Patton
and Sheppard (2015) which investigated the equities market. Additionally, we
are able to comment on changes in the asymmetric effects as one moves along
the yield curve by employing 5-, 10-, and 30-year Treasury futures data. Past
work has shown important distinctions between the foreign exchange, equities,
and Treasuries market with respect to other aspects of realized volatility fore-
casting, but the literature has not considered the differences when examining
semivariance. We find that negative semivariance has much stronger effects on
future volatility than positive semivariance for longer dated maturities. Addi-
tionally, we find that both positive and negative jumps dampen future volatility,
although to different degrees.
iii
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Chapter 1
Latent Effort in Procurement
Auctions with Items Under
Warranty
1.1 Introduction
State governments have begun experimenting with the use of warranties in pro-
curement auctions, leaving the winning contractor responsible for the project
maintenance after initial completion.1 Although warranties are understood in
the posted-price market, their effects on outcomes and competition in auctions
have been ignored (Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998)). Despite the lack of aca-
demic analysis, these contracts continue to receive considerable attention in the
real world. The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT), for exam-
ple, spends over $200 million annually at procurement auctions where the job
being procured comes with a warranty for the work (roughly 32% of the dollar
value of all their contracts). Ohio, Florida, and South Carolina are other early
adopters, each spending over $100 million on Department of Transportation
1Throughout this chapter, I use ‘procurement auction’ to refer to an auction where con-
tractors submit bids to complete a task for the state, and the lowest bidder wins the right to
complete the task.
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warranty contracts annually (Bayraktar, Cui, Hastak, and Minkarah (2004)).
The main goal in implementing warranties through procurement auctions is
to reduce states’ long-term costs and transfer risk from the state to the contrac-
tor. How does the introduction of these warranties change the way contractors
bid, and should others consider using them? I develop a structural model and
use data from Michigan procurement auctions in order to answer these ques-
tions as well as analyze the long-term benefits of implementing such auctions
more broadly.
A key contribution of my paper is to study how a contractor’s effort plays
a role in procurement auctions, as is the case with auctions where a warranty
is assigned to the project. Unfortunately, a contractor’s effort is not directly
observable by the state or econometrician, complicating attempts to model and
estimate it. To better understand the effects of warranties on contractors’ effort
and bids, as well as the benefits to the state, it is essential to consider the
incentives faced by both parties involved in the transaction. In the traditional
setting where there are no warranties, the state is responsible for maintaining
and correcting any issues related to the project that arise after completion.
Even when construction meets the standards set out by the state, repairs and
upkeep are common, according to engineers overseeing these projects. These
future repairs are a major burden for the state. Under the setting where the
project has a warranty, though, the burden of project maintenance is transferred
to the winning contractor, relieving the state of any maintenance costs over the
life of the warranty.
Conversely, the contractor is incentivized to complete the task using the least
expensive methods given the requirements, since any price markup of the bid
2
over the contractor’s cost is profit to the contractor. In standard auctions, least
expensive simply means using the level of effort that is required to fulfill the
minimum standards of the job. In other words, contractors are not rewarded
for producing work that goes beyond the requirements. When a warranty is
attached to the job, “least expensive” takes on a more complex interpretation.
From the contractor’s perspective, undertaking higher effort is costly in the short
run; it requires the contractor to use expensive technologies and techniques.
This higher level of effort leads to a lower probability that a contractor will need
to undertake corrective action in the future. This tradeoff between increases
in immediate cost and lower expected future costs, both due to higher effort,
defines the tension a contractor faces when determining the optimal level of
effort. Specifically, I model immediate and expected future costs, making both
types of costs functions of a contractor’s endogenous effort choice. This cost
structure introduces the tradeoff in effort choice necessary for studying these
auctions that is not present in the current literature.
In this first attempt to empirically study the endogenous choice of effort
by the contractor, I directly compare the results to standard auction contracts
in order to inform policymakers as to the implications. By nesting the stan-
dard auction model as a special case, I study how warranties affect outcomes
relative to the standard auction setting, as well as how a misspecified model
where effort was not optimally chosen (standard auction model) leads to results
that inform policymakers to undertake actions against their best interests. By
keeping the model as simple as possible while accounting for the institutional
details associated with highway procurement, my model facilitates a transparent
interpretation of the results.
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In order to estimate the model with latent effort choice in auctions, I use
a unique data set containing ex post data that captures outcomes related to
the effort choices of the contractors. This data set, provided by MDOT, lists
all projects that were procured with a warranty as well as measures of ex post
corrective action taken by the contractors. This corrective action information
is essential to empirically estimating a model with latent effort choice by the
contractor. My identification strategy relies on the quasi-natural experimental
setting that brought about the introduction of warranties. By estimating the
underlying latent cost distribution of contractors and using information related
to ex post corrective action, I am able to uncover the proportion of jobs asso-
ciated with extra effort, the immediate cost increase due to the effort, and the
potential long-term effects of adopting better technology and techniques.
I find that the introduction of warranties leads to higher effort work. Over-
all, these findings support general theoretical predictions about how warranties
affect effort and serve as evidence that the model of endogenous effort choice is
an important next step in understanding the mechanism currently being used.
In total, roughly 30% of firms are willing to optimally undertake higher effort
to offset future costs associated with corrective action.
Counterfactual analysis shows that in order to universally implement these
contracts, it would have increased the immediate costs to Michigan by $68.7
million over the period I study ($17.2 million annually). Over the longer term,
though, Michigan would actually realize savings from using warranty auctions,
which accounts for the fact that MDOT would no longer be responsible for the
maintenance of the projects over the life of the warranty. Under some additional
assumptions, I show that the net benefit when accounting for reduced future
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costs by the state, related to managing corrective action in the standard setup,
exceeds $3 million a year. Additionally, I find potential long-term benefits
that could arise from widespread adoption of these contracts leading to cost
reductions when performing high effort work.2 If the additional immediate cost
markup from undertaking high effort work were to fall by 10%, total costs
from employing warranty auctions would fall an additional $6.1 million, further
encouraging the use of these innovative contracts.
Highway procurement auctions, with their rich set of project-level observable
covariates, are a natural choice to study the effects of policy changes on auction
outcomes, and there is good reason to believe these results would carry over
to other settings. Bidders in many other settings, such as telecommunications,
energy, and commercial construction, face similar demands from the state in
terms of performance and effort. Additionally, the bidders in these alternative
settings have some commonalities with highway contractors in terms of fixed
and variable costs, making the model I employ directly relevant.
The structure of my paper proceeds as follows. I briefly discuss the existing
literature in Section 2. Next, I present my model of bidding in warranty auc-
tions in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the data I use from MDOT, highlighting
the novel data I introduce to recover information related to latent effort choice.
Section 5 outlines my empirical strategy and presents the results from my esti-
mation. I undertake two counterfactual experiments to better understand the
costs and benefits to the state in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2These cost reductions are related to the R&D induced by the warranty auctions and the
learning-by-doing aspect of undertaking high effort work. See Tiererova (2013) for a formal
model of learning-by-doing in procurement auctions.
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1.2 Brief Literature Review
My paper brings together strands of literature in empirical auctions while adding
to the emerging literature on warranties. First, I discuss recent papers on non-
standard auction contracts, as they serve as the primary motivation for this
paper. Next, I relate my work to other studies on highway auctions and briefly
discuss the methodological foundations of my approach. I conclude with a brief
description of the highway engineering literature, which provides evidence that
both motivates and supports my modeling decisions.
Closely related to the subject of this paper, there has been increased atten-
tion devoted to what are called “innovative contracts.” Whereas the standard
highway procurement contract is awarded to the lowest qualified bidder for a
set date of completion, at which point they are relieved of all of their responsi-
bilities to the state, innovative contracts have recently been employed to more
properly align the incentives of the contractors and state by adding caveats to
contracts.
In Lewis and Bajari (2011a), the authors considered scoring auctions, where
the bidder submits both a dollar value and a time of completion. The data
showed that this selection mechanism, known as an A+B contract, substan-
tially reduced the time contractors took to complete their jobs when compared
to the standard auction. Similarly, Lewis and Bajari (2011b) evaluated how
time incentives in contracts “motivate adaptation.” Their work quantified these
effects by applying incentives or disincentives in ways that help states accom-
plish their goal of time completion.
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The literature on warranties and producer liability is saturated with theo-
retical results but is still less developed on the empirical side. Two of the major
theoretical papers include Spence (1977) and Cooper and Ross (1985), the latter
of which considers effort in the context of upkeep by a purchaser of a good in a
posted-price market. Of the limited empirical work related to warranties, there
is one recent paper that is especially of interest to my study. Roberts (2011)
looked at how warranties can substitute for reputation in online auctions. He
did not fully develop an auction model, rather he looked at some reduced form
results related to the policy switch from the auction platform not having any
warranties to having all warranties. In this way, his paper is related to Lewis
(2011) in that both papers tried to understand what observable features af-
fected the selling price, but neither of these papers went so far as to estimate
the primitives of a full auction model. Roberts (2011) found that warranties did
not reduce the premium commanded by sellers with high reputations, except
for those sellers with the highest reputations.
Some early work on highway auctions focused on trying to detect collusion
and bid rigging. Porter and Zona (1993) laid the foundation for empirical work
on highway auctions by considering data from procurement auctions in New
York. Bajari and Ye (2003) estimated models of both competition and collusion
to try to detect if the observable bidders were colluding. An interesting feature
of their work was the incorporation of information from industry specialists, as
I also use conversations with employees at MDOT and private contracting firms
to motivate many of my modeling decisions.
More recently, a few papers have captured more nuanced aspects of the pro-
curement process, including auction dynamics (see Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
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(2003) and Balat (2012)). Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2006) approached the
dynamic cost considerations in a similar way to my paper. When bidders submit
their bids in highway auctions, they do so by line item (groundwork, paving,
trenching, etc.) even though the total of all line items is used to determine
the winner. Their paper considered a framework where contractors were able
to anticipate changes to the quantity of inputs demanded by the state for each
line item and strategically bid such that they would be optimally compensated
at a future date for these changes. My model treats the expectation of future
corrective action costs as being known to the contractors, and the contractors
alter their bids accordingly to account for such expenses.
I use the nonparametric techniques first developed by Guerre, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2000), of which many papers extended the results to analyze alternative
paradigms (see Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002), Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2003), and Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000)). I develop an identification and
estimation strategy that exploits having data on outcomes under different auc-
tion structures, in my case warranty and standard auctions. This reliance on
different structures is similar to Lu and Perrigne (2008), which used outcomes in
timber auctions for both English and sealed-bid auctions to learn about bidders’
costs and risk aversion.
Although warranties on highways have not been studied by economists,
these innovative contracts have been examined by many engineers. Cui, John-
son, Sharma, and Bayraktar (2010), Thompson, Anderson, Russell, and Hanna
(2002), Gharaibeh and Shirazi (2009), and Bayraktar, Cui, Hastak, and Minkarah
(2004) all looked at how states implemented these new warranty contracts.
These papers discussed the differences between warranty contracts and standard
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contracts, emphasizing that warranty contracts allowed the contractor some
freedom with her materials. The papers also tended to agree on the reasons
for such contracts: higher quality, lower life-cycle costs, and a redistribution of
risk. Some of the papers discussed methods for modeling the risk associated with
the warranties while others discussed survey results from contractors and state
agencies. One paper used those surveys to estimate that warranties account for
between a 0 to 15% increase in bids. Overall, these papers provide a helpful
technical perspective when trying to understand new warranty contracts.
1.3 Model
I introduce latent effort into an auction model framework to account for how
effort affects total project costs. I draw comparisons between the auction model
where the project being procured comes with a warranty (henceforth called
“warranty auctions”) and its standard auction counterpart, and show the stan-
dard model is nested as a special case. This new model provides the flexibility
needed to analyze my setting where the level of effort is endogenously selected
by the bidder. It is natural to first discuss the standard auction model in order
to have a grasp on what information is available in that environment as well as
provide the basic intuition for the more complicated model needed to consider
warranties.
To be as clear and explicit as possible, I adopt notation common to the auc-
tion and econometrics literature. Random variables in my model, the bids and
cost draws, are denoted by capital letters whereas their realizations are in lower
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case. When dealing with distributions of variables observed by the econometri-
cian, I use G(·) for the CDF and g(·) for the pdf, whereas distributions that are
unobserved are denoted by F (·) and f(·). This convention will be convenient
when walking through my estimation strategy that involves taking observed
bids and backing out the unobserved costs. Lastly, I use bold to distinguish
vectors from scalars.
I start my analysis of the standard procurement auction by considering the
expected profit function for player i. For simplicity, I assume there is just
one auction with n ≥ 2 bidders. I will introduce additional notation in the
estimation section to account for multiple auctions with different numbers of
bidders across auctions, but for now I have:
E[πi|c1i] = (bi − c1i)Pr(bi < b−i)
where −i represents all of bidder i’s competitors. In the equation above, bi
is bidder i′s submitted bid, c1i is bidder i
′s cost draw which is assumed to
come from the distribution Fc1() with compact, convex support [c, c].
3 The
term Pr(bi < b−i) represents the probability that bidder i
′s bid is less than
her competitors’ bids, thus winning the auction in the procurement setting. I
assume cost draws are i.i.d. with bidders all drawing from the same distribution.
This puts my framework under the umbrella of the symmetric independent
private values (IPV) paradigm.4
Using β() to denote the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid function,
3I have a 1 in the subscript of the cost draw because when I expand my model to the case
with warranties, I include an additional (future) cost draw, c2i, and I want to make clear
which cost draws are the same across auction formats and which cost draws are new.
4See Paarsch and Hong (2006) for details related to this framework.
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I take first order conditions with respect to bi:
∂π
∂bi




with the following solution (see Paarsch and Hong (2006)):





Although standard auctions were the only mechanism employed by depart-
ments of transportation (DOT) leading up to the 1980s, some states started
experimenting with alternative mechanism in order to provide incentives for
contractors to change behavior by shifting risk from the state to the contractors.
North Carolina was the first state to have their DOT use warranty auctions for
highway pavement marking in 1987. By 1999, over 20 states had experimented
with using warranty auctions in various ways. Michigan is regarded as one
of the most active users of warranty auctions, which is one of the main rea-
son for using its data in my empirical analysis (Bayraktar, Cui, Hastak, and
Minkarah (2004)). Minnesota, another leading state in terms of warranty auc-
tion implementation, described the use of warranty auctions as follows: “The
goal of instituting warranties on projects is to improve the quality and dura-
bility of products by allowing a longer time frame to accept work constructed
by contractors. This process is also aimed to encourage contractors to improve
their construction techniques and use better equipment to meet the warranty
requirements (Construction and Contracting (2006)).”
The desired increase in effort and increased use of innovative techniques that
motivate the employment of warranty auctions seem to play out in practice.
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When interviewed, contractors commented on different ways they changed their
behavior when constructing a warranty job, including getting more design input,
using better equipment, bringing innovative technology and methods to the job,
as well as general quality conscious construction (Bayraktar, Cui, Hastak, and
Minkarah (2004)). When the procured job involves paving, DOTs found that
warranty contracts induce contractors to take preemptive action to improve
poor underlying soil conditions (Management (2007)). Contractors have also
found long-term benefits from investing in new formulations of concrete, which
include silica fume, steel, and organic fibers, in order to raise the strength of
the road for longevity (Skinner Jr (2008)).5
These increases in effort come with consequences: the near term increases
in the costs, and thus bids, of contractors. All responses from contractors in
a survey study indicate they bid just as much or more in the warranty setting
than in the standard auction setting (Bayraktar, Cui, Hastak, and Minkarah
(2004)).
Motivated by these findings, I model these contracts by adding flexibility to
the cost function of each firm in order to account for both the potential immedi-
ate increases in costs as well as potential future costs of corrective action.6 More
specifically, I allow firms to choose to undertake extra effort today, which could
represent using more innovative and costly materials, employing more special-
ists, or other costly management decisions, in order to reduce their probability
of having to correct for issues that fall under the warranties.
5While high-performance concrete has been measured to have strength of 10,000 p.s.i, the
new formulations have managed to triple that strength and offer far superior durability.
6Corrective action is the official term used by MDOT to describe any required repairs the
contractor must undertake during the lifetime of the warranty contract.
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More formally, I model firms as having a choice of employing extra effort,
ē, that directly scales their immediate costs in the following linear fashion:
(1+ ē)c1i. A contractor can also choose to undertake no extra effort to complete
the project, in which case her immediate cost would simply be c1i. To restate
the choice in notation, contractor i has a choice of exerting extra effort, ei,
where ei ∈ {0, ē}.
Next, I model the future cost component of having to undertake corrective
action as ProbCA(ei = 0)δc2i, for the case when no extra effort is undertaken.
Here, δ is the proportion of the job needing corrective action, ProbCA(ei = 0)
is the probability of corrective action in the future given the choice of not
undertaking any extra effort today, and c2i is a second cost draw made in the
future if one needs to undertake corrective action. I model the second cost draw
as coming from the same distribution as the original cost draw, Fc2() = Fc1().
Additionally, I assume that the two cost draws are independent. If one thinks
about these cost draws as being some idiosyncratic costs related to the bidder
at the time of the original auction, it is reasonable to assume there will not be
dependence between this draw and the one they receive years later when they
need to undertake corrective action. Conversations with industry specialists give
credibility to this assumption. Contractors use extra effort ē to eliminate their
chance of having to undertake corrective action in the future (i.e. ProbCA(ei =
ē) = 0), and thus there is no expected future cost associated with that decision.
This assumption facilitates a clear way of interpreting how much extra effort
is actually captured by ē and what the tradeoffs are in this case. Thus the




(bi − c1i − ProbCA(ei = 0)δµc)Pr(bi < b−i) if player i chooses to not
exert extra effort (ei = 0)
(bi − (1 + ē)c1i)Pr(bi < b−i) if player i chooses to
exert extra effort (ei = ē)
A player’s expected cost when she chooses no extra effort is c1i +ProbCA(ei =
0)δµc and with extra effort is (1 + ē)c1i.
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The player can solve the maximization with respect to ei while abstracting
away from the choice of bi, because whatever effort level she may want to employ
when formulating her bid is the same effort level she will employ if she is the
winner. No new private information arrives between the formulation of bid and
initial construction by the winner, therefore there will be internal consistency.
A player will choose her optimal effort e∗ following the rule:
e∗ =
{
0 if (1 + ē)c1i − c1i > ProbCA(ei = 0)δµc
ē otherwise
I will refer to the following object as the cutoff point, where players are
indifferent between the effort choices:
c∗ ≡ ProbCA(ei = 0)δµc
ē
(1.2)
The intuition behind this equation is when choosing whether to exert extra
effort or not, there is a tradeoff between incurring the immediate costs of the
extra effort for the initial job and reducing future expected costs by reducing
her probability of having to undertake corrective action. Below the cutoff point,
bidders choose extra effort, whereas above the cutoff point they do not exert
7The µc in the expected profit equation follows directly from player i’s cost draws being
independent, coming from the same distribution, and c2i not being realized until corrective
action needs to be undertaken. More formally, E[c2i|c1i] = E[c2i] = µc2 = µc1 = µc.
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extra effort. When the probability of corrective action increases, the cutoff point
also increases, indicating that a higher proportion of bidders will draw costs
associated with optimally choosing extra effort. Similarly, when the immediate
cost markup of undertaking extra effort ē increases, c∗ decreases, implying that
fewer bidders will choose to use extra effort.
Again, letting β(·) represent the equilibrium bid strategy, for which the bid
amount is invertible and monotonic in the cost draw, I have the following bid
function for the case where there is a warranty:8





for c1i > c
∗ (1.3)











for c1i < c
∗
1.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
This section describes the data and provides descriptive evidence for the as-
sumptions underlying the model. Observable data on repair work, which are
unique to this data set, are given special attention.
1.4.1 MDOT Highway Procurement Auctions
The data come from the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT).
Similar to other government entities, MDOT uses sealed-bid, low price procure-
ment auctions in order to allocate projects. In the case of MDOT, they are
concerned with the construction and maintenance of state infrastructure, with
a focus on roads and bridges.
8See Appendix for details.
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MDOT makes results from their auctions readily available on their website.
The results display the auction ID (which is uniquely assigned to each auction),
a brief description of the job, the bidders, their total bids, and also the indi-
vidual line items for each of the bidders. To elaborate on this last element,
when MDOT offers up a project through an auction, they have bidders submit
individual dollar estimates for the different components of the project. These
items can be removal of past structures, groundwork, installation of barriers,
etc. These individual items are then totaled and used to evaluate the competi-
tiveness of the bids.
I first analyze all data for both warranty and standard auctions that fall
within the entire window available, 1999-2014. Table 1.1 presents some basic
summary statistics related to the auctions and winning bids in both settings.
Due to my use of ex post data on corrective action in my empirical setup, I need
to limit my sample to make sure the warranty periods have expired by the time
I collected the data. Additionally, I limit the start of my data to the time when
MDOT began widely adopting the practice of experimenting with warranties,
which happened in 2001. Lastly, with a vast majority of my bids coming from
auctions with n = 2, ..., 6, I will limit my attention to these auctions for reasons
that will be more apparent in the estimation section. Table 1.2 presents the
summary statistics for the data that I use as my estimation subsample. To get
a better sense of the types of work undertaken, Table 1.3 displays the breakdown
of jobs by type.
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1.4.2 Additional Data on Corrective Action
In addition to having information on the bids and project characteristics, I have
information related to the (potential) corrective action undertaken by contrac-
tors on all warranty project. These data were obtained from MDOT by the
Freedom of Information Act. The data show which projects needed corrective
action, when the corrective action started and ended, as well as an estimate by
the contractor as to how much the corrective action cost. This estimate of costs
is a noisy measure, but the other information is said to be precisely reported.
1.5 Estimation and Results
I develop a multistage estimation procedure in order to recover the latent cost
distribution as well as parameters related to effort. I first adopt additional
structure on the cost draws that fits the specific context of my empirical in-
vestigation. This structure allows me to separate out costs that arise due to
common observable factors from those that are due to individual idiosyncracies.
Next I recover the full latent distribution of costs directly from observable bids.
Lastly, I use the cost distribution to recover the remaining effort-linked param-
eters that are central to warranty auctions. Once I have fully recovered the
latent cost distribution and remaining effort-linked parameters, I conduct pol-
icy and counterfactual analysis related to the decision by the state to implement
warranty auctions alongside standard auctions.
One hurdle the econometrician comes across in carrying out analysis on
empirical auction data is that in practice the items being auctioned are not,
in fact, identical. Some projects are more complex, take place at different
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times, and have different requirements for completion. Fortunately, all of the
heterogeneity in projects just mentioned is captured in the documents provided
by MDOT to the bidders (and me).
There are few established methods for dealing with this observed hetero-
geneity. I follow Balat, Haile, Hong, and Shum (2015) in accounting for these
observables by “homogenizing” the bids before carrying out the rest of my empir-
ical strategy. Alternatively, it is possible to extend my nonparametric approach
below by conditioning on the covariates when estimating the CDFs and pdfs
needed to construct the pseudovalues. One benefit of using such a technique
would be that all of the identification results easily extend to this conditional
case. Unfortunately, though, the practical implementation of such a technique
can be difficult if one has a rich set of covariates, as I do. In my case, the curse
of dimensionality causes my pseduovalue calculations to be imprecise.
My approach essentially normalizes the bids by subtracting off the expected
mean conditional on covariates. After normalizing the bids through this method,
I can directly apply the estimation methods in the case where identical goods
are being auctioned. I assume cost draws are made up of two components, as
defined by:
ci` = Ψ(z`)ai` (1.4)
where Ψ(·) is some function of observable auction level covariates, z`, and ai`
is an individual and auction level i.i.d. draw that is independent of z`. In my
analysis, I follow Asker (2010) and define Ψ(z`) = e
ψz` . This allows for both the
mean and variance to be affected by covariates, which is realistic in my setting.
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Balat, Haile, Hong, and Shum (2015) and Asker (2010) show that if one thinks
of there being some normalized value of covariates, z0, which need not even
exist in my data, then:
β(ci`;n, z`) = Ψ(z`)β(ci`;n, z0)
Letting α(n) = E[ln(β(C;n, z0))],
ln(bi`) = α(n`) + ψz` + εi`
Thus by running a standard regression of bids on observable auction covari-
ates, including dummy variables for the number of bidders in each auction, I
am able to recover Ψ̂(). In order to end up with a “homogonized” bid b0i`, I
subtract the shift in the bid that comes from the observable covariates:
ln(b0i`) = ln(bi`)− ψ̂(z`)
The homoginized bid represents the bid the player would have submitted in
the case where their observable covariates were z0. The coefficients from this
homogonization regression are presented in Table 1.4. The results appear in
line with what I expected having spoken to industry experts.
In what follows, I will use b to represent the homogonized bids and c to repre-
sent this i.i.d. cost draws in order to simplify notation and facilitate comparison
with other papers in this literature. The seminal work of Guerre, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2000) provided nonparametric identification results that apply to my
setting, and I follow their constructive estimation procedure using the homogo-
nized bids in order to recover the latent cost distribution.
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Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) were the first to show that the first
order condition in equation 1.1 can be rewritten as:
ci` = ξ(bi`, G, n) ≡ bi` −
(1−GB(bi`;n))
(n− 1)gB(bi`;n)
where I refer to ξ(bi`, G, n) as the inverse bid function, since it maps bids and
their distribution into cost draws. This inverse bid function is the key devel-
opment that allows me to recover the latent cost distribution directly from the
observed bids. My estimation strategy requires me to first estimate the bid























Kernel density estimators requires a choice of kernel K and bandwidth hg. I
use the triweight kernel (see Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), Li, Perrigne, and





(1− u2)3I(|u| ≤ 1)
with the bandwidth selection following the selection criteria of Silverman (1986).
That bandwidth is defined as:
hg = 2.978× 1.06σ̂b(nL)−1/5
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where σ̂b is the standard deviation of observed bids. As has been noted in the lit-
erature, nonparametric estimators can be biased near the boundaries, therefore
I trim the boundary to eliminate the unwanted properties of the estimator (see
Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002) for details related to the trimming procedure).
Having recovered both ĜB and ĝB, I am able to use equation 1.5 to back
out an estimate for the cost draw ĉi`, known as the pseudocost, for each bid bi`:
ĉi` = bi` −
(1− ĜB(bi`))
(n− 1)ĝB(bi`)
After recovering all of the estimated pseudocosts, I consistently estimate the
true underlying cost distribution and density through similar nonparametric
estimators. The CDF uses an empirical distribution estimator analogous to the














hf = 2.978× 1.06σ̂c(nLT )−1/5
where σ̂c is the standard deviation of pseudocosts after the trimming stage, and
LT represents the number of auctions that remain after trimming.
Figures 1.1a and 1.1b plot F̂c and f̂c, respectively. I use a block bootstrap to
estimate the 95% confidence intervals (Kunsch et al. (1989)). These estimates
are enough to explore a wide range of policy relevant questions, but in order
to address issues related to effort choice and warranty costs, I need to consider
additional data to recover relevant parameters.
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I use F̂c, f̂c, and the unique ex post corrective action data to recover the re-
maining effort-linked parameters. Before proceeding with estimation, I establish
the proportion of the enitre project that is typically addressed by contractors
when corrective action is needed. Recall that this amount is represented by δ
in my model. I carefully consider the ex post self-reported data in coordination
with expert insight from MDOT engineers to arrive at an value of δ = 8%.9 Next
I use the Generalized Method of Moments to match theoretical moments that
are functions of effort and the probability of corrective action to their empirical
counterparts:
Moment n : E[ProbCA(ei = 0) ∗ [1− F (c∗)]n − ProbCAn] = 0 for n = 2,..,N
(1.5)
where I define ProbCAn as the fraction of all warranty auctions with n bidders
that need corrective action. The Appendix shows how having the ex post correc-
tive action probabilities for two different numbers of bidders and the underlying
cost distribution is enough to identify the remaining terms, but I choose to im-
pose the restriction for n = 2, ..., 5 to improve the precision of my estimates.
In my data, I see whether corrective action needed to be undertaken for each
warranty auction. The empirical counterpart to the moment above is:







9See Appendix for discussion of these data and how I arrived at this value. As a robustness
check, I reestimated the model by perturbing δ within reasonable bounds and all of the results
remained qualitatively similar.
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From these moments, I estimate ē = .043, with standard error of 0.018, and
ProbCA(ei = 0) = .515, with standard error of 0.17. Interpreted separately,
these estimates imply that immediate costs are increased by a 4.3% when extra
effort is used, and when extra effort is not used the probability of corrective
action is slightly over 50%. Although these estimates can be discussed separately
as I have just done, perhaps the implications from them are best understood
when taken together. One direct implication from my estimates is that 29.3% of
bidders’ cost draws associated with higher effort work.10 Although this simple
statistic may not be a particular target goal set out by policymakers, it can be
easily understood by all parties involved with deciding the fate of the warranty
auction program. When comparing the immediate costs of the program to the
benefits, such a statistic can serve as a helpful reference to recognize how the
incentives provided by the warranty contracts induce a substantial portion of
the contractors to undertake higher effort work.
As a test of my model’s fit, I use the estimated primitives to simulate war-
ranty bids and compare moments to all true warranty bids as well as just the
true winning bids. In this simple exercise, I focus on warranty bids where n = 4,
because this is the average number of bidders in these particular auctions. In
addition to considering what my model predicts when calculating moments, I
consider what I call the “myopic approach.” In the myopic case, I simulate bids
from the cost draw using the traditional bid function. This is considered myopic
bidding because it represents what the bidder would do if they were only worried
about immediate costs and did not take into account future costs. In this case,
10Since winning bidders in my setting are the lowest bidders, this percentage is even higher
for winners.
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they would never exert costly extra effort and bid as if ProbCA(ei = 0) = 0.
This myopic case should not be taken too seriously, since we assume bidders
do account for the cost tradeoffs of exerting extra effort, but it serves as a nice
benchmark for understanding how these new costs affect bids.
Figure 1.2 plots the empirical distribution of observed warranty bids (solid
black) versus those generated from my warranty model simulation (dashed red).
Table 1.5 compares the first two moments for observed and simulated bids,
including the moments from the myopic case. As expected, the myopic case
underestimates the average bid. My model’s simulated bids slightly exceed
observed winning bids, on average, and tend to show more dispersion than
observed bids, but overall achieve a reasonable level of fit considering warranty
bids were not used in estimation of the primitives. In general, my model strongly
outperforms the myopic case when trying to match the true observed bids.
1.6 Policy Implications
The results section discussed some of implications that are easily derived from
the estimates, but this section looks to briefly explore more in-depth policy
implications as they relate to further actions the government could undertake
to encourage or or discourage costly effort. These exercises allow me to quantify
the effect warranties and the effort-linked parameters have on auction outcomes,
which inform how policymakers should approach their use.
1.6.1 Implementation of All Warranty Auctions
One theme of question that kept coming up during discussions with employees
from MDOT was how much it would cost the state to do a full implementation
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of warranty auctions. In order to address this, I simulate warranty bids from
estimated pseduocosts in standard auctions to compare the winning bids from
my simulation to those from the observed data. This addresses how much it
would have cost the state, but I should note that because bids are a function of
observable covariates in addition to cost draws, future projects could cost more
or less based on project characteristics.
Taking all standard projects and treating them as warranty projects would
have immediately increased the cost to the state by $68.7 million in total over
the time frame I consider ($17.2 million annually). This is just the immediate
cost increase, though, because the state benefits from having the contractor
take care of future work. As a rough estimate for the net effect from the state’s
perspective, accounting for the fact that warranty auctions relieve the state of
having to perform maintenance, I add the expected future costs of corrective
action to each of the standard bids (assuming this cost will be directly paid
by the state) and compare these “total costs” from standard auctions to the
total costs under the warranty auction setting.11 This approach indicates that
the state has a net benefit of $3.88 million annually from using the innovative
warranty contracts.12 It is beyond the scope of this paper to model the state as
strategically selecting when to undertake these projects given state funding con-
straints, but this complication could help explain future contract assignments
11The total costs in the warranty auction setting are simply the winning bids, since the
state is not responsible for corrective action.
12This approach puts some strong assumptions on the state, such that if they were to
perform corrective action their cost draws would come from the same distribution as the
contractors’ cost draws. Since the state is outsourcing the projects to begin with, it can be
reasonably argued that the state’s cost draws are likely to be higher than the contractors’
draws. If that were the case, warranties would prove to be even more effective at saving the
state money.
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that seem suboptimal given the net benefits discovered here.
1.6.2 Long-Term Reduction in Cost of Effort
Lastly, as was pointed out in the modeling section, states are hoping that war-
ranties encourage innovation and can help lower the costs of increased effort
over a longer time horizon. As cost saving technology and techniques are devel-
oped and refined as a consequence of warranty auctions, states would reap the
benefits of the lower costs. In this section I simulate a set of warranty auctions
under different settings of future ē in order to let policymakers better under-
stand potential longer-term savings of sticking with this program that are not
captured over the short span of my data.
Since my data do not provide any insight into the expected cost reductions of
new technology, and those I spoke with at MDOT did not feel comfortable going
on record with their estimates of future cost reductions, I present a range of
results that paint a broad picture of potential future benefits. More specifically,
I build on results from the last section where I simulated warranty bids from
the set of pseduocosts backed out from the standard auction and repeat the
analysis for ê = .9ē, .75ē, and .5ē. When thinking about how this hypothetical
reduction in ē affects bids, its important to remember that not only will this
reduce immediate costs for those already choosing to undertake higher effort
work, it will also encourage more bidders to undertake higher effort work.13
From the baseline case in the last section where ē simply is equal to my
original estimate, the immediate cost markups of using warranties over standard
13To see how this works mechanically, remember the definition of c∗. In equation 1.2 ē is
in the denominator. Lower ē leads to higher c∗, which in turn leads to a higher percentage of
bidders undertaking extra effort work.
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auctions are $62.4 million, $55.9 million, and $37.3 million for the cases of
.9ē, .75ē, and .5ē, respectively. Thus, in the case where the future ē is reduced
by half from its current level, the state can expect to save and additional $31.2
million of its current immediate costs over the same time frame. While it may be
idealistic to assume that there could be a 50% reduction in the effort component
over the longer term, it is worth considering since new technologies, like the
ones discussed in the introduction, are rapidly being tested and used by more
companies.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper considers procurement auctions where the item being procured is
under warranty by the winning contracting firm. This contract structure in-
centivizes firms to potentially use a higher level of effort, as more effort today
leads to lower expected future costs. The model I develop explicitly accounts for
contractors’ latent effort choices affecting both immediate and expected future
costs in opposite directions.
I estimate that roughly 30% of bidders are willing to undertake extra effort
in order to offset future costs. If all of the standard auctions were to have
been conducted as warranty auctions, MDOT would have needed to pay $68.7
million more in terms of immediate costs, but would have benefited from the
risk reduction and lower future costs. I find the state saved as least $3.88 million
annually by implementing these warranty auctions.
One of the major reasons states claim to use warranty auctions is to en-
courage the development and adoption of better resources and techniques. My
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counterfactual evidence shows that if the immediate cost markup associated
with undertaking this high effort, ē, falls by 50% due to, say, widespread adop-
tion and learning-by-doing, then the additional immediate cost associated with
undertaking these auctions falls to less than $40 million. This decrease is partly
due to the reduction in costs associated with those already choosing to use
higher effort but also associated with the endogenous shift to using the less
expensive higher effort techniques by those currently planning to use regular
effort.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for All MDOT Auctions 1999-2014
All Contracts
Standard Warranty
Engineer’s Estimate ($M) 1.21 3.35
(3.3) (8.9)




Number of Bidders 5.2 3.69
(3.1) (2.0)
Number of Items 63.1 81.7
(55.7) (109.3)
N 10906 1775
Note: Means are presented on the first line of each variable row
and standard deviations are in parentheses on following line.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Subsampled MDOT Auctions 2001-2004
All Contracts
Standard Warranty
Engineer’s Estimate ($M) 1.05 2.34
(2.62) (5.72)




Number of Bidders 3.89 3.30
(1.32) (1.26)
Number of Items 55.1 60.4
(50.8) (89.3)
N 1,953 477
Note: Means are presented on the first line of each variable row
and standard deviations are in parentheses on following line.
30
Table 1.3: Types of MDOT Projects 2001-2004
All Contracts
Number Frequency
New Construction and Reconstruction 314 12.92
Rehabilitation and Resurfacing 842 33.65
Preventative Maintenance 398 16.38
Bridge 205 8.43




Table 1.4: Results from Homogenization Regression 2001-2004





















Table 1.5: Moments for Model Fit: n=4
All Contracts
Data Warr Sim Myopic Sim
Mean: all bids ($M) 0.92 0.92 0.84
Standard Deviation: all bids ($M) 0.86 0.87 0.80
Mean: winning bids ($M) 0.83 0.87 0.75
Standard Deviation: winning bids ($M) 0.79 0.83 0.72
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Table 1.6: Monte Carlo Homogonazation Regression Results
True Value Estimate Standard Error
β1 0.50 0.50 0.01
β2 0.30 0.30 0.01
Table 1.7: Monte Carlo Effort Results
True Value Mean Median Standard Deviation
ē 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.13
ProbCA 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.04
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Figure 1.1a: CDF of Pseudocosts
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Figure 1.1b: pdf of Pseudocosts
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Figure 1.2: Model Fit: CDFs of Observed and Simulated Bids
Note: These are the CDFs from the true data (black) and simulated data (red) for warranty
auctions with n = 4.
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Figure 1.3a: Monte Carlo CDF of True Drawn Costs
Note: The red line depicts the true (theoretical) CDF, the blue line presents the median
of the empirical distribution function estimates performed on the generated cost draws, and
the dashed black lines represent the 95% confidence region of the estimates performed on the
generated cost draws.
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Figure 1.3b: Monte Carlo pdf of True Drawn Costs
Note: The red line depicts the true (theoretical) pdf, the blue line presents the median of
the kernel estimates from the generated cost draws, and the dashed black lines represent the
95% confidence region of the estimates from the generated cost draws.
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Figure 1.4a: Monte Carlo CDF of Pseudocosts
Note: The red line depicts the true (theoretical) CDF, the blue line presents the median of
the empirical distribution function estimates performed on the estimated pseudocosts, and
the dashed black lines represent the 95% confidence region of the estimates performed on the
estimated pseudocosts.
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Figure 1.4b: Monte Carlo pdf of Pseudocosts
Note: The red line depicts the true (theoretical) pdf, the blue line presents the median of
the kernel estimates from the estimated pseudocosts, and the dashed black lines represent the
95% confidence region of the estimates from the estimated pseudocosts.
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Chapter 2
On Misclassification Errors in
Self-Reported Surveys
2.1 Introduction
Misclassification of drug use is pervasive in self-reported surveys and has impor-
tant implications for both research and policy. It is well known that estimators
ignoring measurement error in the independent variable can be biased and in-
consistent, complicating how to interpret results and analysis. Many factors
lead to reporting error in population surveys, and the stigma associated with
drugs only adds to the difficulty of finding an accurate measure of self-reported
drug use. We estimate a nonlinear model with nonclassical measurement error
in covariates using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 in
order to find the extent to which measurement error is present in self-reported
drug use. Our identification and estimation strategy allow us to consider mis-
classification in multiple variables, giving us a more realistic framework for
analyzing the problem.
Our approach to correct the misclassification error has important implica-
tions for many areas of research. There exists a wide body of literature in labor
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economics and health economics focusing on the effects of drug use as they re-
late to youth behavior, wage rates, labor supply, and employment. Kaestner
(1994) uses the NLSY to measure the effect of drug use (both marijuana and
cocaine) on labor supply. He finds that when looking at a cross section there is
a significant negative effect of drug use on labor supply, but when using a lon-
gitudinal sample there is no significant effect. MacDonald and Pudney (2000)
use two cross sections from the British Crime Survey data to study the relation-
ship between drug use and labor market outcomes. Other studies by DeSimone
(2002), French, Roebuck, and Alexandre (2001), and French, Zarkin, Mroz, and
Bray (1998) all rely on self-reported data when estimating their results related
to drug use and employment. Some of the labor economics literature addresses
issues of endogeneity of drug use, but the literature has not given the same
attention to measurement error that could be significantly affecting the results.
Some studies from the health economics literature are concerned with how
drug use is related to educational attainment and abuse of other substances.
Bray, Zarkin, Ringwalt, and Qi (2000) use longitudinal data on students in
the US public schools to estimate the relationship between marijuana use and
dropping out of school. They find that students using marijuana are roughly
2.3 times more likely to drop out than students who abstain. The authors also
investigate how these odds of dropping out vary across the age of the students.
A study by Beenstock and Rahav (2002) uses a self-reported measure of drug
use to test the Gateway Theory of drug use, and it concludes that the use
of cigarettes leads to marijuana use. Norton, Lindrooth, and Ennett (1998)
attempt to account for endogenously selected peer groups when analyzing peer
effects on substance abuse. Using longitudinal data from a drug use prevention
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program, they find a significant role for peer effects even after controlling for
peer selection. It would be interesting to investigate how the existing results
change after correcting the misreporting error in self-reported drug use.
Our identification strategy is also important to the econometrics literature.
Nonlinear modeling with measurement error has been an active area of research
recently (see Chen, Hong, and Nekipelov (2011) for a survey). The literature
focusing on classical error, where the measurement error is independent of the
latent variable, has built off the work by Hausman, Newey, Ichimura, and Powell
(1991). Recent studies include Schennach (2004) and Schennach (2007), which
use an instrumental variable (IV) approach also featured in this paper. The work
by Hui and Walter (1980), Mahajan (2006), Hu (2008), and Hu and Schennach
(2008) all relax the assumption of independence between the latent true variable
and measurement error. The results of Hu (2008) have recently been used by
Balat (2012), Sasaki (2011), and An, Hu, and Shum (2010). Moreover, Molinari
(2010) discusses the identification of treatment effect when some observations
on treatment are missing. A more closely related work is by Kreider, Pepper,
et al. (2011) in which the misreporting of drug use is analyzed under the mixing
outcome sampling assumption. This paper uses the results of Hu (2008) in
identifying and estimating our model with misclassification, and is the first
to estimate such a complicated misclassification error. We allow for two latent
variables when estimating the joint distribution of reported and actual drug use,
and our method is well suited to be adopted by researchers who find it realistic
to have both present and lagged latent variables affect misclassification.
Misreporting errors in self-reported drug use surveys have been extensively
studied. Mensch and Kandel (1988) compare the self-reported drugs use in
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the 1984 NLSY survey to other surveys and conclude that the NLSY data was
subject to underreporting. Some studies attempt to quantify the measurement
error in drug use responses using advanced statistical techniques, but none use
the methodology presented in this paper. Biemer and Wiesen (2002) employ
latent class analysis in order to characterize the classification error in the US
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. Biemer and Witt (1996) use tech-
niques that require repeated measures of the variable of interest, largely focusing
on methods first developed by Hui and Walter (1980). Taking as given the find-
ings from medical journals on the ties between marijuana use and increases in
health problems (see Polen, Sidney, Tekawa, Sadler, and Friedman (1993) and
Volkow, Baler, Compton, and Weiss (2014)), our paper adds to the misreport-
ing literature by offering a way to measure this misclassification while flexibly
allowing for multiple variables to have measurement error.
In our model, we assume a nonparametric distribution of misclassification
errors which are allowed to be correlated with explanatory variables. With rel-
atively few restrictions we are able to identify the misclassification probabilities
and directly estimate latent variables whenever instrumental variables are avail-
able by using an eigen-decomposition method. We show that in general, when
people indeed use drugs during the current or previous periods, the probability
for him or her to misreport is significantly larger than zero. Also, this misre-
porting probability is contingent on the past misreporting behaviors as well as
drug use history.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model
and identification strategy that allows for two latent variable. Section 3 discusses
simulation results employing our identification strategy. Section 4 describes data
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we use in our estimation and some assumptions we make regarding key variables.
This section also presents our estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Model and Identification
In this section, we use the nonparametric identification method from Hu (2008)
to estimate the misclassification error of reported marijuana use. Specifically,
we are interested in the conditional distribution of reported marijuana use, Dt,
on the unobserved latent variables indicating the true marijuana use status,
D∗, namely Pr(Dt|D∗).1 We restrict our attention to discrete measures of all
variables. We present results using two approaches: the basic approach using
data from four consecutive periods and assuming misclassification of only one
variable, and a more general approach using data from five consecutive periods
that allows for misclassification of multiple variables. Specific assumptions for
each case will be illustrated and discussed in this section. Lastly, two major the-
orems will be presented which directly address the identification and estimation
of our model.
2.2.1 Basic Approach
In this part, we consider five types of discrete variables: the reported health
condition variable at time t, Ht, the self-reported drug use at time t, Dt, the
latent true level of drug use at time t, D∗t , the self-reported drug use at time
t− 2, Dt−2, and lastly the two other independent variables, (Dt−1, Ht−1). They
are displayed in Table 2.1.
1D∗ can be a scalar or a vector. In our basic model, D∗ simply refers to the true drug use
status D∗t . In our general case, it is a vector indicating the true drug use status both at time
t and t− 1.
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We are interested in the misreporting error distribution Pr(Dt|D∗t ,Wt) where
Wt refers to all the other covariates. In order to derive the major theorem for
identification and estimation, let us make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1.1
Pr (Ht|D∗t , Dt, Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2) = Pr (Ht|D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1) (2.1)
Assumption 1.1 states that conditional on the last-period report about drug
use and health condition, Dt and Dt−2 provide no relevant information beyond
D∗t to predict the current period health condition. We are implicitly assuming
that after considering the report from the previous period, the misclassification
error is completely independent of Ht. This immediately indicates that the
bias of misreporting current-period marijuana use is the same for healthy and
unhealthy people alike if they report the same health and drug use status in the
previous period.
Next we impose the conditional independence restrictions on the misclassi-
fication error.
Assumption 1.2
Pr (Dt|D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2) = Pr (Dt|D∗t , Dt−1) (2.2)
This assumption states the misclassification error is independent of Dt−2 and
Ht−1, conditional on the true latent drug use status, D
∗
t , as well as last-period’s
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reported drug use status, Dt−1. This assumption is reasonable because misre-
porting of marijuana use should only be dependent on whether, in fact, they
used drugs this period and how they reported drug use last period as captured
by Dt−1.
Note that we only assume conditional independence between the misclassi-
fication error and (Ht,Dt−2,Ht−1); other than this, we do not restrict the inde-
pendence between the error and any other covariates such as gender, education
level, and marital status. Furthermore, these assumptions are weak in the sense
that we do not impose any specific functional forms on the error term.
As mentioned earlier, we focus on discrete cases where for τ ∈ {t−2, t−1, t}:
Dτ =
{
1 if report using marijuana at least once in the period or “no response”
0 if report no marijuana use during the period
and the latent variables are:
D∗τ =
{
1 if used marijuana at least once during the period
0 otherwise
And for the dependent variable:
Hτ =
{
1 if in good health
0 if in bad health
for any time period τ. Under Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2, one can show that for
any function ω (·)∑
Ht




Pr (Dt|D∗t , Dt−1)× E [ω (Ht) |D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1]× Pr (D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2)
(2.3)
These equations relate observed distributions to the underlying latent distribu-
tions, and they will be used to prove identification of our model.
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2.2.1.1 Identification
We define for any given dt−1, ht−1,
Lω(Ht)(Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2) =[ ∑
Ht
ω (Ht) Pr (Dt = 1, Ht, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = 1)
∑
Ht
ω (Ht) Pr (Dt = 1, Ht, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = 0)∑
Ht
ω (Ht) Pr (Dt = 0, Ht, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = 1)
∑
Ht
ω (Ht) Pr (Dt = 0, Ht, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = 0)
]
LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 = [Pr (Dt = i|D
∗
t = j, dt−1)]i,j∈{1,0},
Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1 =
[
E [ω (Ht) |D∗t = 1, dt−1, ht−1] 0
0 E [ω (Ht) |D∗t = 0, dt−1, ht−1]
]
,
LD∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 = [Pr (D
∗
t = i, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = j)]i,j∈{1,0},
and
LDt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 = [Pr(Dt = i, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = j]i,j∈{1,0}.
We may then show that equation (2.3) is equivalent to
Lω(Ht)(Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2) = LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1 × LD∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2
(2.4)
and corresponding to a degenerated ω (·) = 1
LDt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 = LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 × LD∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 . (2.5)
We need to make an assumption on an observable matrix in order to allow us
to proceed with our eigen-decomposition technique.
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Assumption 1.3 The matrix LDt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 is invertible.
Given our assumptions, we invert both sides of (2.5) and multiply these by
the corresponding sides of (2.4) to get:
Lω(Ht)(Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2) × L−1Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2
= LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1 × LD∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2×
L−1D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 × L
−1
Dt|D∗t ,dt−1




for any given (dt−1, ht−1). For the remainder of this subsection we will refer to
Lω(Ht)(Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2) × L−1Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 as the left-hand side (LHS) matrix.
Looking at equation 2.6, we see that the right-hand side is in the form of an
eigen-decomposition of the LHS matrix. Thus, each column of the LDt|D∗t ,Dt−1
matrix is a eigenvector of the LHS matrix. The diagonal elements of the
Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1 are the corresponding eigenvalues. Therefore we can directly
identify the distribution of misclassification errors, LDt|D∗t ,Dt−1 , from this matrix
diagonalization process.
We can see that all the LHS variables are observable from the data, which
means the LHS matrix can be directly calculated. In order to complete our
identification, we need to place an ordering on the eigenvectors and guarantee
uniqueness of the eigenvalues.
Assumption 1.4 For any given dt−1,
Pr (Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = dt−1) < Pr (Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = dt−1) (2.7)
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This means the element of the upper-right corner of the misclassification matrix
LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 should be smaller than that of the upper-left corner. This assumption
is reasonable because the probability of those who do not use drugs but report
using drugs during the period should be very small. This assumption has the
flavor or truth-telling that will also be present in our general model. Hence,
by checking this criteria we can determine the correct order of the eigenvectors
along with corresponding eigenvalues.
Lastly, we need to impose one additional assumption on the eigenvalues:
Assumption 1.5 For any given dt−1 there exists an ht−1 and a function
ω (·) such that,
E [ω (Ht) |D∗t = i, dt−1, ht−1] 6= E [ω (Ht) |D∗t = j, dt−1, ht−1] , for any i 6= j.
(2.8)
This assumption ensures that the two eigenvalues are not identical to each
other. Without this assumption we cannot successfully identify the misclassifi-
cation matrix because it could be singular, and there would be no variation in
the conditional distribution of Dt|D∗t . Note that here we do not require this in-
equality to hold for each pair of (dt−1, ht−1). Instead, we only need one subgroup
of people sharing the same ht−1 for any given dt−1, such that their health-related
function ω is contingent on true latent drug use at t.
So far we have made a series of assumptions, and the following theorem
justifies our identification and estimation:
Theorem 1.1 Suppose Assumptions 1.1-1.5 hold, then the misclassific-
tion probability Pr (Dt|D∗t , Dt−1) is nonparametrically identifiable and directly
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estimable.
Remark: A nice feature of our approach is that, the identification result is
independent of the potential misclassification of the dependent variable, Ht, so
long as its conditional distribution satisfies Assumption 1.4 and 1.5.
This basic approach uses an eigen-decomposition technique and identifies 2 ×
2 misclassification matrices. The next section will cover a more complicated
model, where we identify and estimate 4× 4 misclassification matrices.
2.2.2 General Approach
Now we use a more general approach, where we impose assumptions that are
empirically more reasonable than those in the first model. Namely, we gener-
alize our conditional independence assumptions by also incorporating a latent
variable from a previous period. We still have in total five types of discrete
variables, yet in each type, we include more variables. The detailed description
is illustrated in Table 2.2.
Here, we use conditional probability Pr(Dt+1, Dt|D∗t , D∗t−1,Wt) to describe
the misreporting behavior, where Wt refers to all the other covariates. Similar













This assumption indicates that the proxy drug use variables, (Dt+1, Dt), and
the instrumental variables, (Dt−2, Dt−3), do not tell us anything more useful
about the person’s current health condition as long as we know the actual
two-period drug use status and their previous-period reported health and drug







(Dt−1, Ht−1) , is independent of Ht. Compared with our previous assumption in
the basic approach, now we allow the current-period health condition to rely on
both current-period true drug use and true drug use from the previous period.
This assumption is more realistic in the sense that people’s health condition is
usually related to his or her drug use history.
We now impose restrictions on the conditional independence between the








Dt+1, Dt|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1
)
(2.10)
Assumption 2.2 implies that the misclassification error is contingent on actual
drug use over two periods. We assume people’s misreporting decisions only
depend on whether they used drugs and how they reported previously. This
assumption is more general when compared to that in the basic model, and this
can be illustrated in a simple example. Consider a person who used marijuana
last year but did not report using it, which is represented by D∗t−1 = 1, Dt−1 = 0.
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Given that he or she is using marijuana this year, D∗t = 1, his or her probability
of misreporting could be higher than those who did not use drug and did not
report last year, but indeed use drug this year, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 = 0, D
∗
t = 1. This
can be justified by assuming the former person has a “habit” for misreporting
his or her drug use, whereas the latter one is more likely to tell the truth for
both periods. On the other hand, there is another driving force in the opposite
direction. The former person who has been using drugs for two years might be
more likely to report truthfully since he identifies himself as a “frequent” drug
user; the latter person who just switched to marijuana this year might be less
likely to report this drug use out of fear of getting into trouble. These two forces
makes the conditional probabilities Pr
(





Dt|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 = 0, ht−1
)
hard to compare, but we have to separate
them. In our previous model, however, we assume these two probabilities are
the same regardless of an individual’s behavior the previous year.
Furthermore, Assumption 2.2 is weaker than Assumption 1.2 since in this







and two extra observable variables. This is
implied by Assumption 1.2 where we assume the error is independent of Dτ−2
given D∗τ and other observable variables, for all τ.
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Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, we may have
∑
Ht



















t−1, Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2, Dt−3
)
. (2.11)
Equation (2.11) relates observed distributions to the underlying latent dis-
tributions, and they will be used to prove identification of our model.
2.2.2.1 Identification




g1 (1, 1, 1, 1) g1 (1, 1, 1, 0) g1 (1, 1, 0, 1) g1 (1, 1, 0, 0)
g1 (1, 0, 1, 1) g1 (1, 0, 1, 0) g1 (1, 0, 0, 1) g1 (1, 0, 0, 0)
g1 (0, 1, 1, 1) g1 (0, 1, 1, 0) g1 (0, 1, 0, 1) g1 (0, 1, 0, 0)
g1 (0, 0, 1, 1) g1 (0, 0, 1, 0) g1 (0, 0, 0, 1) g1 (0, 0, 0, 0)

where g1(i, j, r, k) =
∑
Ht
ω (Ht) Pr (Dt+1 = i,Dt = j,Ht, Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2 = r,Dt−3 = k) ,




g2 (1, 1, 1, 1) g2 (1, 1, 1, 0) g2 (1, 1, 0, 1) g2 (1, 1, 0, 0)
g2 (1, 0, 1, 1) g2 (1, 0, 1, 0) g2 (1, 0, 0, 1) g2 (1, 0, 0, 0)
g2 (0, 1, 1, 1) g2 (0, 1, 1, 0) g2 (0, 1, 0, 1) g2 (0, 1, 0, 0)
g2 (0, 0, 1, 1) g2 (0, 0, 1, 0) g2 (0, 0, 0, 1) g2 (0, 0, 0, 0)

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where g2(i, j, r, k) = Pr(Dt+1 = i,Dt = j, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = r,Dt−3 = k),for




g3 (1, 1|1, 1) g3 (1, 1|1, 0) g3 (1, 1|0, 1) g3 (1, 1|0, 0)
g3 (1, 0|1, 1) g3 (1, 0|1, 0) g3 (1, 0|0, 1) g3 (1, 0|0, 0)
g3 (0, 1|1, 1) g3 (0, 1|1, 0) g3 (0, 1|0, 1) g3 (0, 1|0, 0)
g3 (0, 0|1, 1) g3 (0, 0|1, 0) g3 (0, 0|0, 1) g3 (0, 0|0, 0)

where g3(i, j|r, k) = Pr(Dt+1 = i,Dt = j|D∗t = r,D∗t−1 = k, dt−1), for any









where, E [i, j] = Eω(Ht)|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1 [i, j] = E
[
ω (Ht) |D∗t = i,D∗t−1 = j, dt−1, ht−1
]
,




g4 (1, 1, 1, 1) g4 (1, 1, 1, 0) g4 (1, 1, 0, 1) g4 (1, 1, 0, 0)
g4 (1, 0, 1, 1) g4 (1, 0, 1, 0) g4 (1, 0, 0, 1) g4 (1, 0, 0, 0)
g4 (0, 1, 1, 1) g4 (0, 1, 1, 0) g4 (0, 1, 0, 1) g4 (0, 1, 0, 0)
g4 (0, 0, 1, 1) g4 (0, 0, 1, 0) g4 (0, 0, 0, 1) g4 (0, 0, 0, 0)





t−1 = j, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = r,Dt−3 = k), for
any i, j, r, k. Thus, the matrix notation would be written as:
Lω(Ht)(Dt+1,Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3) =LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1
× LD∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3 (2.12)
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and corresponding to a degenerated ω (·) = 1
LDt+1,Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3 = LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 × LD∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3
(2.13)
We need to make an assumption on an observable matrix in order to allow
us to proceed with an eigen-decomposition technique.
Assumption 2.3 The matrix LDt+1,Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3 is invertible.
Given these assumptions, we invert both sides of (2.13) and multiply these
by the corresponding sides of (2.12) to obtain:
Lω(Ht)(Dt+1,Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3) × L−1Dt+1,Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3
=LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1 × LD∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3×
L−1D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3 × L
−1
Dt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1




As was done with the basic model, we will refer to Lω(Ht)(Dt+1,Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3)×
L−1Dt+1,Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3 as the LHS matrix. Thus, the LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 ma-
trix is the eigenvector matrix of the LHS matrix, and the diagonal elements of
the Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1 are the corresponding eigenvalues. We can directly
identify the distribution of misclassification errors, or LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 , from
this matrix diagonalization process.
As discussed in previous section, after recovering the eigenvectors and eigen-
values, we need to determine the correct ordering that is consistent with the
LHS matrix. Therefore we make the following assumption:
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Assumption 2.4 For Dt−1 = 1,
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = 1, Dt−1 = 1) > Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 = 1)








Ht|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 = 1
]
.
For Dt−1 = 0,
Pr(Dt = 0|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 = 0) > Pr(Dt = 0|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 = 1, Dt−1 = 0)








Ht|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 = 0
]
.
This assumption directly gives us the ordering of the eigenvalues and eigenvec-
tors needed to establish identification. For Dt−1 = 1 case, we assume people
primarily consider their current-period true drug use status as a reference of how
they report it. Specifically, we assume that people who are using marijuana in
current period would be more likely to report using it than would people who
are not currently using marijuana. Another factor that influences people’s cur-
rent reporting behavior is their last-period misreporting behavior. We assume
people who have been using marijuana for both periods and reported using it
last period have the highest probability of reporting this period again; and peo-
ple who use marijuana this period but not last period, but report using it last
period, have the second highest probability of reporting drug use this period.
Thus, we are able to identify two columns of our misclassification matrix, and
for the other two we use eigenvalues to distinguish them, as is illustrated in
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the second equation for Dt−1 = 1 case. We assume that the expected reported
health condition is better for those who do not use marijuana either period,
compared with those who use marijuana last period but not this period. Sim-
ilarly, for Dt−1 = 0 case, we assume that people who do not use marijuana in
either period have the highest probability of not reporting marijuana use this
period. People who do not use marijuana this period but used it last period
would have the second highest probability of not reporting it now. For the other
two cases, we assume the expected health condition for those who use marijuana
both periods is worse than those who only used it in the current period.2 These
assumptions have the flavor of “truth telling” as a eigenvalue and eigenvector
ordering mechanism.
Lastly, to make the identification effective, we need to impose restrictions
on the eigenvalues:
Assumption 2.5 For all values of Dt−1 there exists some ht−1 such that
E
[
ω (Ht) |D∗t , D∗t−1, dt−1, ht−1
]
6= E [ω (Ht) |D∗t , dt−1, ht−1]
6= E
[
ω (Ht) |D∗t−1, dt−1, ht−1
]
. (2.15)
It states that for those who reported using drugs last period, there exists at
least one subgroup of people who share (dt−1, ht−1) for whom their current
health condition depends both on current drug use status and previous drug













2See Polen, Sidney, Tekawa, Sadler, and Friedman (1993) and Volkow, Baler, Compton,
and Weiss (2014) for further motivation of these assumptions.
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type people when j 6= k. In that case we would have duplicates in the eigenval-
ues, and the identification fails. The following theorem justifies our identifica-
tion and estimation:
Theorem 2.1 Suppose Assumptions 2.1-2.5 hold, then the conditional
probability Pr
(
Dt+1, Dt|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1
)
is nonparametrically identifiable and di-
rectly estimable.
Remark: As is discussed in the basic approach, the misclassification of the
dependent variable Ht has no effect on our identification results, so long as the
conditional distribution satisfies Assumption 2.4 and 2.5.
In the next section we run simulation for both the 2× 2 and the 4× 4 cases to
justify the validity of our models, and then we use NLSY data to estimate the
misclassification errors in marijuana use.
2.3 Simulation
2.3.1 Basic Approach
In this section we generate a set of data using underlying parametric values, and
then we use our nonparametric identification method to estimate the misclas-
sification matrices. Information regarding the data generation process can be
found in the appendix. We compare these estimates with the true underlying
matrices in order to validate our method. We first generate all the data that are
related to our estimation, namely (D∗t , Ht, Ht−1, Dt, Dt−1, Dt−2). Using both ob-
servable data, (Ht, Ht−1, Dt, Dt−1, Dt−2), and unobservable latent variable D
∗
t ,
we are able to calculate the sample average of the misclassification matrices of
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interest, Pr (Dt|D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1) . Lastly, we use only observable data to estimate
P̂r (Dt|D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1) according to Theorem 1.1. If the difference of these two
matrices converges as the sample size increases, then our basic model is valid.
2.3.1.1 Simulation Results
The mean, median, and standard errors for simulation results are displayed in
Tables 2.3. There are several things to point out here. Firstly, the means and
medians are converging to the true value as the sample size increases. Secondly,
the standard errors are decreasing as the sample size increases. This convergence
indicates that our method of identification is at least correct asymptotically. In
fact when the sample size is 7000, which is very close to that of our real data, the
simulation results are already significant. This further validates our estimation
using the basic model.
The results indicate that some estimated probabilities are much more accu-
rate than others. This is due to the loss in accuracy associated with inverting
the LHS matrix if it is near singular. This loss in accuracy can be remedied,
however, by increasing sample size and therefore canceling out inaccurate esti-
mates from a single trial.
2.3.2 General Approach
In the general model, we need more data regarding previous drug use and health




t−1, Dt+1, Dt, Dt−1, Dt−2, Dt−3).
We use the data generation process in the next subsection to generate all these
data, then we use all information, observable and unobservable, to calculate
the sample mean of the true values of the misclassification matrices. Lastly,
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as before, we only use observable variables to estimate this matrix according
to Theorem 2.1 and compare this estimation result with the underlying true
values.
This simulation process, compared with that in the basic model, is more
complex and needs careful consideration. Instead of estimating two 2 × 2 ma-
trices, we are now estimating two 4× 4 matrices. As was the case in the basic
model, any inaccuracy can be resolved as we increase the sample size. These
features will be discussed in the simulation results section.
2.3.2.1 Simulation Results
The mean, median, and standard errors for simulation results are displayed in
Tables 2.4. We can see that when we have a sample size of 7000 and 10000, the
estimation results are farther from the true values when compared to the basic
model. The standard errors are larger than those found in the basic model as
well. Our results once again show that our general model is also correct at least
asymptotically, or when we have relatively large sample size.
2.4 Estimation
2.4.1 Data
The data we use in our analysis come from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The NLSY97 is a panel survey conducted by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics that captures the transition from youth to adult-
hood. The data consist of detailed information on a cohort of approximately
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9000 youths who were between the ages of 12 and 16 when the survey was
first administered in 1997. These individuals were asked questions covering
areas such as background, employment, drug and alcohol use, health, family,
and education. Previous literature that has investigated self-reported drug use
sometimes focused on the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse data, but
we take advantage of the panel nature of the NLSY97 to obtain our estimates
of misclassification.
The variables central to our study include marijuana use and health condi-
tion. Additionally, we can account for gender, age, marital status, ethnicity, and
education level, but these are not crucial to our estimation and identification
of the model. 3 We select 2008 as the basis year for our analysis, the year that
places the respondents between the ages of 23 and 27. We make use of 5 years
of data in our estimation, and 2008 also happens to be the latest year we can
choose as our basis year because data are only available through 2009 at this
time.
Health is measured by the respondents on a 1-5 scale, representing “excel-
lent”, “very good”, “good”, “fair”, and “poor”, respectively. We group the
respondents who answered “very good” and “good” into the same category,
which we call responding 2.5, because these groups are very similar and the in-
crease in sample size allows for more accurate estimates. We would use a more
objective measure of health if one was available in the NLSY97, but since the
responses are all self-reported it is unclear how to create a more accurate mea-
sure of health using responses from other questions (such as height and weight).
3The main reason why we do not include other explanatory variables as in the drug use
literature is due to the sub-sample size restriction. We do present results conditioned on
gender to highlight the difference between those subpopulations.
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For marijuana use, we use a variable in the data that indicates whether the
respondents claim to have used marijuana at all since the date of the previous
interview. To make this variable binary, we group those who admitted to using
marijuana with those who did not respond to the question or said they could not
remember. Participants who said they did not use marijuana in the last year
make up the other group. For background information, we use the responses
available from the initial 1997 survey and the 2008 survey when appropriate.
In order to run our estimation we take some steps in dropping observations.
We disregard all observations (individuals) who were not interviewed for any
of the 5 years our variables span. Respondents were not interviewed because
they could not be tracked down or were otherwise unavailable, and since we
require data on all 5 years we need to drop these people. Additionally, we
drop respondents who did not respond to the health condition question. The
percentage of participants who did not respond to this question in 2008 and
2007 was less than 1%. We do not believe that dropping these observations bias
our results. Our sample thus reduces to 6298 individuals. Table 2.5 displays
summary statistics for our sample. When conditioning on covariates, we drop
observations that did not have a response for any of the variables on which we
were conditioning. While an omission of a response about drug use may be in-
formative about whether that person has actually used drugs, we do not believe
the same is true for omissions on questions regarding background. Assuming
that agreeing to be interviewed but not answering questions about background
information is independent of true drug use, the results presented here are not
biased. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide some reduced-form evidence on how drug use
status is affected by lagged covariates, and how health status is affected by drug
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use status. In those tables, all of the variables are binary except for health (H)
which takes on the values discussed above. For the remaining variables, D = 1
if the participant used marijuana in the previous year, Post-HS Education = 1
if awarded any degree beyond a high school diploma by 2008, Married = 1 if
married, White = 1 if white, and Male = 1 if male.
2.4.2 Basic Approach
We use 2008 as the basis year to do the estimation. In total there are 6298
effective observations. As is depicted in Assumption 1.5, when we do estimation
for each subgroup of dt−1, we would like to find the best subsample of ht−1
such that the eigenvalues are most distinct from each other and therefore the
estimation is most valid. After trying different strategies, we decide to combine
the samples where Hτ equals 2 or 3.
4 They account for nearly 70% of the
total population, and this increase in the sample size for a particular subgroup




1 if in “excellent health condition”
2.5 if in “very good or good health condition”
4 if in “fair health condition”
5 if in “poor health condition”
,
In addition, we assume,
E [Ht|D∗t = i, dt−1, Ht−1 = 2.5] 6= E [Ht|dt−1, Ht−1 = 2.5] , for any i.
which is a specification based on Assumption 1.5.
4For robustness check, we also provide estimation results by combining Hτ = 1, 2 and 3 in
the appendix.
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The main estimation results are shown in Table 2.8, while Table 2.9 and
Table 2.10 are the estimation results conditional on gender covariate. There
are several interesting results from this table. Firstly, for any given Dt−1, the
probability of reporting drug use for actual drug users is higher than those non-
drug users. For the first two rows of each table, by assumption the truth-telling
dominant rule is true; but for the third and fourth row, it still holds. For those
who did not report marijuana use last year and did not use marijuana this
year, the estimated probability of reporting drug use is zero. This is consistent
with any intuition that leads one to believe the misreporting problem is mostly
related to individuals trying to hide true drug use. The misreporting problem
is most prevalent with people who did not report drug use last year and did
use drug this year (D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0). The estimated probability of telling the
truth is only 30.89%, much lower than the 82.23% where participants reported
using marijuana last year. Our estimation for the true marijuana use proportion
in the cohort is 32.13%, significantly higher than the reported proportion of
17.61%. These results show the significant role of misclassification error in
the data. When we condition on gender and reestimate the misclassification
errors, the only major difference between females and males arises when the
individuals did not report using marijuana last year but use it this year (i.e.
D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0). In that situation, males are more likely than females to hide
the truth and misreport this year.
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2.4.3 General Approach
In this section, we adopt the general model and estimate the misclassification
matrices according to Theorem 2.2. Similar as in the basic case, we combine
Hτ = 2 and 3.
5 The results are presented in Tables 2.11, and results when
conditioning on gender covariates are presented in Table 2.12 and Table 2.13.
Firstly, the general results are mostly consistent with those from the basic
model. For instance, the people who have been using marijuana for both periods
and reported using it last period have a probability of reporting usage as high as
75.02%. By contrast, people who have not used marijuana for either period and
did not report usage last period have a very low probability (1.78%) of reporting
usage this period. Secondly, conditional on true drug use in the previous period,
people who reported using marijuana last period are more likely to report using
it again this period. These results seem to display certain habits in behavior.
Another exciting result lies in the fifth row of Table 2.11, where people used
marijuana last year but misreported this drug use. When continuing to use
drugs this year, the probability for them to report the truth is less than 40%,
much less than those who already told the truth last period (75.02%). This
helps show the severity of misreporting problem in the survey.
Recall the example we used to motivate our more general model where we
stressed that two individuals who were likely to have different reporting behavior
would be captured by the same probability when only one latent variable was
present. The comparison of the seventh and eighth row shows us the importance
of incorporating last-period marijuana usage status. The rows tell us that, when
5In the appendix we also reestimate the measurement error matrices by combining Hτ =
1, 2 and 3, as in the basic case.
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people used marijuana last year but hid the truth, he or she is still much more
likely to report using marijuana (24.72%) compared with those who do not use
drugs for two years and do not report using it last year (1.78%).
The estimates for expected reported health conditions are more dispersed
than in the basic case, as is shown in the ninth through sixteenth row of the ta-
bles. Also the standard errors are much larger compared with those in the basic
case. At a price of losing the estimation accuracy of the eigenvalues, we are able
to gain more accuracy of estimated eigenvectors which represent the misclassi-
fication errors of primary interest. Here the estimated eigenvalues only serve a
role to distinguish different columns of eigenvectors, therefore it is acceptable
in this application to have some eigenvalues that are out of proportion.
When we condition on gender covariates, the distinction between males’ and
females’ misreporting behavior become clearer than in the basic case. Firstly
consistent with the basic case, when males reported no marijuana use last pe-
riod, they are more likely to follow their “habit” of saying “no” to the same
question this period even though they in fact are using marijuana, as is shown
by the fifth and sixth rows of Table 2.12 and Table 2.13. Moreover, when using
marijuana last year and telling the truth, males are more likely than females
to report “yes” to the same question this year, even when they are not using
marijuana this year, (62.34% versus 39.18%). In other words, males appear to
be more stuck with their last-period reporting behavior than are females, at
least in some cases.
One thing to note is the probability of Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 =
0) for males (10.11%). It is not very different from Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 =
1, Dt−1 = 0) = 11.16% for males, which indicates that males who are non-drug
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users this year and did not report using it last year have a probability as high
as 10% of reporting usage this year. Somewhat counterintuitive as it seems,
when we bootstrap for the mean and median, we found that they are much
more distinctive from each other. The median for Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 =
0, Dt−1 = 0) reduces to 6.21%, which looks more reasonable. We suspect that
the high point estimation is resulted from some deeper unobserved patterns
within the male subgroup, which calls for further study into the misreporting
problem, conditional on more covariates.
One last observation is the marginal probability of true marijuana usage.
It can be seen from the last rows of Table 2.11, Table 2.12 and Table 2.13.
Males have higher probability of using marijuana than do females (17.02% versus
10.43%), but all of the marginal probabilities are not quite different from the
probability of reporting marijuana use. Again, if we look at the bootstrap means
and medians we see results that are higher than our point estimates. This tells
us that people are not always underreporting their marijuana usage, instead,
there exists noisy reporting phenomenon in both directions.
2.4.4 Hypothesis Testings of the Conditional Indepen-
dence Assumptions
In this section we would like to test the validity of the conditional independence
assumptions we have made in deriving our identification models. Specifically
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we test the following hypotheses:
2.4.4.1 Basic Approach
Firstly we would like to test whether Dt−1 always plays a role in determining
the distribution of Dt given D
∗
t . Namely, the null hypothesis is:
H0 : Pr(Dt|D∗t , Dt−1) = Pr(Dt|D∗t )
versus the alternative hypothesis,




Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1)− Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0)
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1)− Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0)
]
,
and test H0 : Λ(i) = 0 versus H1 : Λ(i) 6= 0 separately for i = 1, 2. Table
2.14 below displays the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for Λ(i). It can be
indicated from the table that the Λ is significantly different from zero, therefore
we could effectively reject the null hypothesis.
2.4.4.2 General Approach
Now we test the validity of the conditional independence of our general model.
Similar as in the basic model, we want to test whether latent variables and the
independently observed variables always play a role in determining the distri-
bution of the proxy. Here, however, we need to do three classes of testings in
total. Firstly we would like to test whether the following equality holds,
H0 : Pr(Dt|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1) = Pr(Dt|D∗t , D∗t−1),
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for each given values of (D∗t , D
∗
t−1).
Specifically, we define Λ1 as the L
2 norm of the difference of two probability
vectors, and test whether Λ1 is statistically significantly larger than zero. In
other words,
Λ1 := ||Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1 = 1)− Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1 = 1)||L2 ,
where for d = 1, 0
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1 = d) :=

Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = 1, Dt−1 = d)
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 = d)
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 = 1, Dt−1 = d)
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1 = d)
 .
And we test
H0 : Λ1 = 0
versus
H1 : Λ1 > 0.
The second hypothesis we would like to test is
H0 : Pr(Dt|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1) = Pr(Dt|D∗t , Dt−1),
for each given values of (D∗t , Dt−1). Following the same logic, we define Λ2 as
the L2 norm of the difference of two probability vectors, and test whether Λ2 is
significantly larger than zero. In other words,
Λ2 := ||Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1 = 1, Dt−1)− Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1 = 0, Dt−1)||L2 ,
where for d = 1, 0
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1 = d,Dt−1) :=

Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = d,Dt−1 = 1)
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = d,Dt−1 = 0)
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 = d,Dt−1 = 1)




H0 : Λ2 = 0
versus
H1 : Λ2 > 0.
Lastly we want to test whether the following equality holds
H0 : Pr(Dt|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1) = Pr(Dt|D∗t ),
for any given values of (D∗t−1, Dt−1). To test this, we first calculate the condi-
tional probability given any particular values of the pair (D∗t−1 = d1, Dt−1 = d2),
where d1, d2 ∈ {0, 1}, and then define Λ3(d1, d2) as the L2 norm of the difference
of these two probability vectors. In other words,
Λ3(d1, d2) := ||Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1 = d1, Dt−1 = d2)−Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1 = d1, Dt−1 = d2)||L2 ,
where,
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1 = d1, Dt−1 = d2) :=
[
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, D∗t−1 = d1, Dt−1 = d2)
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, D∗t−1 = d1, Dt−1 = d2)
]
, for
d1, d2 ∈ {0, 1}. We test whether Λ3 is significantly larger than zero 6, i.e.
H0 : Λ3(d1, d2) = 0
versus
H1 : Λ3(d1, d2) > 0.
Table 2.15 displays the bootstrap confidence intervals for each of the statis-
tics we use in our testings. It can be seen from the table that, none of the
bootstrap confidence intervals is significantly close to zero, which means we can
reject all the null hypotheses, therefore our conditional independence assump-
tions are valid for the general case.
6Note that Λ3 is a L
2-norm which is always nonnegative, so we do one-sided test here
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we use an eigen-decomposition method from Hu (2008) to esti-
mate the misclassification errors in self-reported drug use. Using reasonable
and relatively weak assumptions in our models, we find that the self-reported
responses from the NLSY97 sometimes underreport the true level of marijuana
use. Both our basic model and general model give us insights into severity and
pattern of this misclassification problem. We conclude that if this misclassifi-
cation problem is simply ignored in empirical work, results could be severely
biased and difficult to interpret. In future work, if we can obtain more complete
data detailing the different levels of marijuana use, we can attempt a continuous














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Means and Standard Deviations of Key Variables From 2008 Survey
Variable Population Females Males
Dt+1 0.1750 0.1415 0.2108
(0.3800) (0.3485) (0.4079)
Dt 0.1904 0.1645 0.2180
(0.3926) (0.3708) (0.4129)
Dt−1 0.1851 0.1504 0.2223
(0.3884) (0.3575) (0.4158)
Dt−2 0.1980 0.1581 0.2406
(0.3985) (0.3649) (0.4275)
Dt−3 0.2190 0.1814 0.2590
(0.4136) (0.3854) (0.4382)
Ht 2.2484 2.3264 2.1652
(0.9428) (0.9454) (0.9330)
Ht−1 2.2188 2.3090 2.1225
(0.9490) (0.9497) (0.9389)
Post-HS Education 0.3069 0.3373 0.2744
(0.4612) (0.4728) (0.4463)
Married 0.2885 0.3236 0.2510
(0.4531) (0.4679) (0.4337)
White 0.5087 0.4871 0.5318
(0.5000) (0.4999) (0.4991)
Table 2.6: Regression Results with Covariates
Dt+1











Table 2.7: Regression Results with Covariates
Ht












Table 2.8: Estimation Results: Basic Approach
Estimated probabilities Point Bootstrap Bootstrap Standard
estimation mean median error
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 0.8223 0.8382 0.8325 0.1200
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 0.5317 0.5157 0.5259 0.1793
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 0.3089 0.3848 0.3008 0.3067
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 0.0000 0.0328 0.0138 0.0472
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 2.4896 2.4976 2.4932 0.0563
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 2.3985 2.3798 2.3888 0.0761
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 2.4419 2.4481 2.4393 0.0657
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 2.3973 2.3936 2.3972 0.0378
Pr(D∗t = 1) 0.3213 0.3409 0.2529 0.2344
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Table 2.9: Estimation Results: Basic Approach for Males
Estimated probabilities Point Bootstrap Bootstrap Standard
estimation mean median error
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 0.7349 0.8076 0.8122 0.1652
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 0.5492 0.4179 0.4399 0.2912
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 0.1901 0.3801 0.2498 0.3502
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 0.0000 0.0376 0.0116 0.0583
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 2.4528 2.4726 2.4650 0.0670
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 2.4154 2.3919 2.4019 0.1064
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 2.3770 2.3781 2.3772 0.0853
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 2.3559 2.3508 2.3566 0.0538
Pr(D∗t = 1) 0.4419 0.3945 0.3058 0.2461
Table 2.10: Estimation Results: Basic Approach for Females
Estimated probabilities Point Bootstrap Bootstrap Standard
estimation mean median error
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 0.8632 0.8591 0.8631 0.1270
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 0.5346 0.5143 0.5336 0.1798
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 0.3661 0.4273 0.3718 0.3165
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 0.0276 0.0357 0.0300 0.0509
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 2.5404 2.5543 2.5459 0.1015
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 2.3595 2.3506 2.3647 0.1211
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 2.5271 2.5358 2.5179 0.1134
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 2.4283 2.4178 2.4260 0.0554










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Asymmetry in the US Treasury
Futures Market
3.1 Introduction
Volatility has captured the attention of those seeking to better understand risk
as well as asset prices more generally, but only recently has attention turned
to decomposing volatility based on the sign and magnitude of the directional
move in price at high frequencies. Recent nonparametric work on modeling
realized volatility stems mostly from the theoretical contributions of Barndorff-
Nielsen and Shephard (2004) and Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006). In
those papers, the authors discussed the convergence properties of estimators
that allow researchers to separate the part of daily measured volatility that
arises from continuous changes in asset prices from the volatility that is due to
jumps in the price.
A growing literature has used these techniques to improve forecasting and
better understand anomalies in asset prices. Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold
(2007) looked across foreign exchange markets, equity markets, and bond yields
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and found that volatility from the jump component is important, but less persis-
tent than the volatility from the continuous component. Their results point to
important improvements in volatility forecasting from decomposing volatility.
More recently, Barndorff-Nielsen, Kinnebrock, and Shephard (2010) pro-
vided additional theoretical results that allow researchers to distill the jump
component from measures of positive and negative return variation, known as
semivarince and more formally defined in the next section. Patton and Shep-
pard (2015) used these results to study the equities market and understand:
i) the asymmetric effects of positive and negative returns on future volatility
and ii) how these new methods can provide insight into the “leverage effect” in
the equities market. As discussed in Figlewski and Wang (2000) and Glosten,
Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), among many others, the leverage effect is the
idea that a drop in price of a stock will lead to higher volatility in the future
(due to, perhaps, the increased leverage in the capital structure). They found
negative semivariance, but not positive semivariance, to be an important predic-
tor of future volatility in the S&P 500 Index (SPDR). Additionally, they found
that the inclusion of semivariance and signed jumps can dramatically increase
the quality of volatility forecasts, even beyond that which could come from an
inclusion of a traditional leverage effect term. The main objective of this paper
is to take techniques outlined in Barndorff-Nielsen, Kinnebrock, and Shephard
(2010) and used in Patton and Sheppard (2015) to study the US Treasury fu-
tures market. Understanding how the asymmetric effects differ between the
different markets could provide insight into price patterns as well as give us a
deeper understanding of how these markets are linked.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical
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results related to the semivariance and jump estimation used in our empirical
analysis section. Section 3 briefly describes the data used in this analysis. Sec-
tion 4 presents the results from our empirical investigation. Additionally, Sec-
tion 4 extends previous work by considering measures of implied volatility when
exploring the relationships between asymmetric price movements and forecast-
ing volatility. Section 5 presents pseudo-out-of-sample estimates that compare
forecasts that account for asymmetric effects from positive and negative price
movements from those that do not. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Overview of Theory and Methods
This section gives a general overview of the model and asymptotic results from
Barndorff-Nielsen, Kinnebrock, and Shephard (2010) used in the empirical sec-
tion. For convenience, we will attempt to use notation from Patton and Shep-
pard (2015) when possible, since most of our analysis serves as a comparison to
the results in that paper. We start by defining the equation that describes the







σsdWs + Jt (3.1)
In the equation above, µs represents the drift component, σt is the càdlàg
volatility process, Wt is Brownian motion, and Jt is the jump process. As defined









where we define ∆ps to represent the jump in price, ∆ps = ps− ps−. As the
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number of intervals becomes infinitely large (or equivalently the intervals them-
selves become infinitely small), the realized volatility converges in probability













where rj is the return from one interval to the next, rj = pj − pj−1, and
m is the number of intervals over the selected time period. The literature has
also supplied us with the convergence properties of bipower variation. This











As one can see, the BV estimator converges to only the continuous compo-







Barndorff-Nielsen, Kinnebrock, and Shephard (2010) proposed using positive
and negative contributions toRV to say something about future predictability of
total RV as well as something about the jump component. We first calculate the











Barndorff-Nielsen, Kinnebrock, and Shephard (2010) showed the conver-

























Incorporating these components separately in a forecasting heterogenous
autoregressive model (HAR) featured in Corsi (2009), instead of just the nor-
mal RV , Patton and Sheppard (2015) discovered asymmetric effects when they
studied the equities market. As highlighted by other papers that have stud-
ied realized volatility across markets, the equities, Treasury, and FX market
have very different historical patterns. Using these methods that incorporate
potentially important asymmetries to study the Treasury market adds to our
knowledge of these differences and provides further insight into the reasons for
different volatility forecasts.
Using these two components, we are able to isolate signed jump variation:







This measure by itself can be very insightful, but in the same way that
RV can have asymmetric effects, there is reason to believe that positive and
negative jumps may also have different predictive ability when looking at future
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volatility. In order to add additional flexibility to our modeling, we will use the
following separate measures later in our analysis:
∆J2+ = (RS+t −RS−t )I{(RS+t −RS−t ) > 0} (3.11)
∆J2− = (RS+t −RS−t )I{(RS+t −RS−t ) < 0} (3.12)
By considering each of the elements above when forecasting RV and BV ,
we get a better sense of the important roles signed high frequency price moves
play in forecasting future volatility over various horizons. Previous work that
only considered daily signed returns, as is often found in the “leverage effect”
literature, is unable to pick up on these nuances.
3.3 Data
We use high frequency 5-, 10-, and 30-year Treasury futures price data to con-
duct our empirical analysis. These contracts are traded on the Chicago Board
of Trade (CBOT). The prices for each security are sampled at a 5-minute fre-
quency, allowing us to distinguish relatively sudden movements from those that
stretch out over the course of a day. These contracts settle quarterly, in March,
June, September, and December. We handle contract rolls by setting the first
5-minute price change equal to zero, instead of the actual difference in contract
prices found in the data.
We make use of data from 1990 through 2012. This span is much larger
than the average span considered by most work that uses these nonparametric
methods of estimating quadratic variation. Additionally, employing this span
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of data allows us to study an interesting mix of pre-recession, recession, and
post-recession dynamics. Lastly, we trim the sample to only include data from
hours where pit trading took place at the CBOT, 8:20 ET until 15:00 ET. This
is the most actively traded time for these securities, and this trimming decision
follows the literature.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
When comparing results to Patton and Sheppard (2015), we will often reference
the findings for the SPDR Index as those related to equities more generally.
We will estimate several models, some including the asymmetric components,
some including jump components, and some including both. Before considering
models that predict future realized volatility, we compute some basic summary
statistics and correlations between various measures used in this section and
present the results in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, respectively.
Table 3.1 looks similar to those found in the equities market in terms of
their relative magnitudes among the different measures. We see that on average
BV makes up a majority of RV , indicating that most of the variation in prices
is driven by a smooth evolution. All significant patterns seen in the summary
statistics of the data hold for all three maturities studied. Figures 3.1a-3.1c show
weekly moving average plots of RV , BV , and |∆J2|, for all three maturities.
In general, Table 3.2 is also very similar in terms of signs, magnitudes, and
relative values between the different correlations, but there are some interest-
ing distinctions both across markets and across maturities in the US Treasury
futures market that are worth noting. Jumps, whether talking about signed
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jumps, ∆J2, or the individual components, ∆J2+ and ∆J2−, hold distinctly
different relationships with RV and BV in the Treasuries market than in the
equities market. RV and BV are much more weakly correlated and sometimes
even negatively correlated with ∆J2. The positive correlation between these
measures appears to grow as we move further along the yield curve. Although
RV and BV are also negatively correlated with ∆J2− in the equites market, the
negative correlation is much stronger in the Treasuries market at all maturities.
Semivariances also show different relationships with other variables in these ta-
bles, and the empirical analysis below highlights some of the consequences of
these different relationships.
3.4.1 HAR Model with Semivariances
Turning our attention to the linear models we employ, as a benchmark we will
first estimate a HAR-RV model. We will use this to look at the relationship
between past daily, weekly, and monthly RV on RVt+h for h = 1, ..., 66 days
into the future, where RVt+h is the h−day average of RV . More formally, we
will first consider:













































As can been seen from the estimators, these measures represent non-overlapping
weekly and monthly lags of RV . Thus our previous HAR example can be rewrit-
ten as:
RV h,t+h = β0 + βdRVt + βwRV w,t + βmRV m,t + εt+h (3.17)
This equation will serve as the basis for comparison when we study the inclu-
sion of asymmetric returns on future volatility. The results from this regression
are shown in Table 3.3a - 3.3c for h = 1, 5, 22, and 66 on the first line for
each h. Our results appear in line with those found for a similar regression on
30-year US Treasury futures in Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007). We
see a high level of persistence with βd + βw + βm ≈ .8, but this is weaker than
that found in the equities market. Also similar to the equities market, we see
the coefficient in front of daily lags, βd, shrinks substantially as we expand the
future forecasting horizon. This makes sense because today’s realized volatility
should intuitively have less information about the realized volatility 6 months
from now than it does about tomorrow’s realized volatility.
Similar to previous studies that looked at US Treasury bonds (see Andersen,
Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007) and Corsi (2009)), the order of the size of the
coefficients has flipped from that of the equities case. We observe that with US
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Treasury futures, βd < βw < βm, across all horizons and all maturities. Lastly,
we find significantly smaller R2 than those found by Patton and Sheppard (2015)
in the equities market, with R2 increasing as h increases unlike the equities
market where R2 fell after h = 5.
Next, we turn our attention to splitting the daily lag RV into its positive
and negative components. This gives us the opportunity to see if there is added
information in decomposing the RV measure, and if so, how the asymmetry
could shed light on some of the volatility patters we have seen in this market.
To our knowledge, we are the first to bring this type of analysis to the US
Treasury market (whether futures or cash). To do so, we estimate:








t + βwRV w,t + βmRV m,t + εt+h (3.18)
where the results are found on the second line for each h in Tables 3.3a - 3.3c.
The general takeaway is both β+d and β
−
d are positive and significant. We plot
βd, β
+
d , and β
−
d in Figures 3.2a - 3.2c for all three maturities at every h. These
figures allow us to easily see that all three estimated coefficients remain positive
but decline as we extend the forecasting horizon.
This may come as a surprise since Patton and Sheppard (2015) found β+d
to be slightly negative across all forecasting horizons and largely insignificant.
Much of their later analysis used this finding to dismiss positive semivariance as
they tried to determine the most useful and parsimonious forecasting model. In
this sense, excluding β+d from our future analysis would appear to be a mistake
given our findings, and we proceed noting the relative significance of positive
realized semivariance in our setting. Also worth nothing, for the 5-year futures
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the magnitude of β+d is greater than that of β
−
d across all horizons. As we move
along to longer dated maturities we see the magnitude of β−d begin to exceed
β+d with the biggest gap between the two coming from the 30-year futures. In
general, though, we find β−d to be substantially smaller than that found in the
equities market. Taking all of this together, the impact of either positive or
negative realized semivariance is more balanced in the Treasuries market than
in the equities market. Although we find these coefficients to be significant,
and in the case of β+d the opposite sign of that found in the equities market, we
see very little gain in terms of R2 from including these terms.1 We explore the
relative benefit of using different models in our pseduo-out-of-sample analysis
found at the end.
Lastly, we explicitly address the issue of the leverage effect. Patton and
Sheppard (2015) discussed how past work looking to study the leverage effect
has typically used an indicator function that is 1 when there is a negative daily
return and interact this with lagged square return. We do something similar and
interact the indicator function with daily lagged RV . Keeping the semivariance
variables in the following equation allows us to say if they provide information
beyond the traditional leverage effect variable. If there is no new information
provided, then the coefficients in front of the two semivariances should not be
statistically different and we would expect βI to be significant, showing that the
leverage effect exists.
1The gains cannot even be captured by our use of 3 decimal places in the table.
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t +βIRVt∗I{rt < 0}+βwRV w,t+βmRV m,t+εt+h
(3.19)
The results from this regression are found on the last line for each h in Tables
3.3a - 3.3c. We find βI to be insignificant for all maturities at all forecasting hori-
zons when we include realized semivariances (which remain significant in most
cases). Drawing the same conclusion as was found in the equities market, we
find the benefit of including additional information about intraday directional
price moves (semivariances) go beyond the benefits found by only considering
a daily return (leverage variable). Investors make heavy use of high frequency
data in modern trading strategies, and this sensitivity to intraday price develop-
ment would support the findings that semivariance remains significant whereas
the daily leverage effect variable is not. There appears little to be gleaned by
comparing the results across maturities, as most of the changes in coefficients
from including the leverage variable seem to hold broadly.
3.4.2 HAR Model with Signed Jumps and Bipower Vari-
ation
Next we consider a set of models that look to tease out the effect of jumps on
future volatility. As was shown earlier, the asymptotic convergence of BV is to
the continuous part of the quadratic variation, and thus we will casually think
of this as representing just that. The following four equations are estimated in
sequence with the results presented in Tables 3.4a - 3.4c. Equation 3.20 captures
our new baseline case:
RV h,t+h = β0 + βBBVt + βwRV w,t + βmRV m,t + εt+h (3.20)
97
The estimates continue to show similar results to those estimated from equation
3.17. Equation 3.21 captures the effect of the jump components, introduced in
equations 3.11 and 3.12, on total volatility:
RV h,t+h = β0 + βJ∆J
2
t + βBBVt + βwRV w,t + βmRV m,t + εt+h (3.21)
The small and insignificant coefficients in front of the jump variable stand
in contrast to the significant (and negative) coefficient found on the same vari-
able in the equities market. This may lead one to believe that jumps are not
important for forecasting volatility of Treasury futures, but this would be the
wrong interpretation. Rather, it is important to consider the possibility that
positive and negative jumps may affect future volatility in the same way, and
therefore a coefficient that implies an increase in magnitude of positive signed
jumps affects future volatility in the opposite way as an increase in magnitude
of negative signed jumps would be unable to capture this nuance. The next
equation adds in the proper flexibility to test this hypothesis. As we did with
RV earlier, we study whether there are asymmetric effects to future volatility
from the signed jump components:




t +βBBVt+βwRV w,t+βmRV m,t+εt+h (3.22)
The results indicate that both positive and negative jumps dampen future
volatility. The positive and significant coefficient in front of ∆J2−t is the oppo-
site of what was found for equities. We plot the coefficients for βJ+ and βJ−
in Figures 3.3a - 3.3c for all three maturities at every h. To make sure that
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this finding is not due to noise in our measure of jumps, we estimate a HAR
model with an added jump variable estimated according to the more traditional
ratio statistic found in Tauchen and Zhou (2011). Their jump measure was
not signed, and therefore our findings from estimating equation 3.22 would in-
dicate that we should see a negative coefficient in front of the jump variable.
Tables 3.5a-3.5c show these results for the three maturities where a significance
threshold of .01 is used to detect jump days. The results confirm our analysis
above.
There could be many reasons why both positive and negative jumps would
dampen future volatility. Although we are unable to explore all the possibilities
in this paper, we recognize the importance of news announcements on price
discovery and jumps in the Treasuries market that may play a role. If jumps
on news announcement days are associated with some resolution of uncertainty
(as reflected by the jump in price of the future contract following the announce-
ment), then this could mean less uncertainty the next day and therefore lower
volatility. Further work is needed to explore this hypothesis.
Unlike equation 3.21, the following equation looks to capture the effect of
the estimated jump component on future volatility coming from the continuous
component:
BV h,t+h = β0 + βBBVt + βwRV w,t + βmRV m,t + εt+h (3.23)
Similar to the equities case, we find that the coefficients closely match those
that are estimated in equation 3.21. There is a dramatic increase in R2, which
is to be expected due to the more stable nature of that time series.
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3.4.3 Inclusion of Implied Volatility
We extend the analysis presented above by bringing in a measure of implied
volatility. The measure used in this paper, the MOVE Index, is produced by
Bank of America Merrill Lynch. According to its description, the measure
represents a “yield curve weighted index of the normalized implied volatility on
1-month Treasury options. It is the weighted average of volatilities on the CT2,
CT5, CT10, and CT30.”
Tables 3.6a - 3.6c display the results from the standard HAR forecasts (equa-
tions 3.17- 3.19) with the inclusion of the MOVE index as an extra covariate and
Tables 3.7a - 3.7c display the results from the signed jump forecasting models
(equations 3.20- 3.23) with the inclusion of the MOVE index.
The dramatic decrease in βw and βm by the inclusion of the MOVE index
can be reconciled by the fact that implied volatility tends to be be more persis-
tent than our nonparametric estimates of realized volatility, and therefore the
more persistent weekly and monthly averages are more affected. For similar
reasons the increase in R2 should be expected. In general, significant results
addressed earlier in this paper hold. We continue to see a positive coefficient
on RS+, although the significance of both RS+ and RS− has diminished. The
relationships between the magnitude of the coefficients in front of RS+ and RS−
continues to hold as we look across maturities. Lastly, we note that βJ+ and βJ−
remain significant at many forecasting horizons, indicating that these variables
continue to provide important information regarding asymmetric effects that go
beyond anything embedded in our measure of implied volatility.
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3.5 Pseudo-Out-of-Sample Evidence
Lastly, we conduct some pseudo-out-of-sample analysis to compare the different
forecasting models. We consider the following 4 models in this section:
HAR-RV Model: R̂V h,t+h|t = β0 + βdRVt + βwRV w,t + βmRV m,t (3.24)








t + βwRV w,t + βmRV m,t (3.25)
HAR-BV Model: R̂V h,t+h|t = β0 + βBBVt + βwRV w,t + βmRV m,t (3.26)
HAR-∆J2±Model: R̂V h,t+h|t = β0 +βJ+∆J2+t +βJ−∆J2−t +βBBVt+βwRV w,t+βmRV m,t
(3.27)
For the forecasting, we use approximately the first 10 years of data (2520
trading days) to estimate coefficients. Next, we forecast ahead the 1, 5, 22,
and 66 day averages of RV . We recompute these estimates and forecasts by
extending the data window one day at a time.
In order to compare the forecasts from different models, we use the methods
proposed in Diebold and Mariano (1995), called the DM test statistic hereafter.
To elaborate a little further, let us first define a loss function. We first consider
the QLIKE loss function, defined by:2
g1(R̂V h,t+h|t, RV h,t+h) = ln(R̂V h,t+h|t) +
RV h,t+h
R̂V h,t+h|t
For robustness, we also consider MSE loss function:
2See Patton (2011) for details related to the QLIKE loss function, including the finite





et+h|t = R̂V h,t+h|t −RV h,t+h
represent the forecasting error. Next, we define dt as the difference in loss
functions of two different models, where those models use information from time
t to forecast RV h,t+h:
di,t = gi(R̂V h,t+h|t, RV h,t+h|m1)− gi(R̂V h,t+h|t, RV h,t+h|m2), for i = 1, 2
where m1 and m2 are added to represent different forecasting models. Under




)1/2 → N(0, 1)
where d̄ =
∑T
t=1 dt, and ω̂ is the consistently estimated asymptotic variance
of d̄
√
T . We use Newey-West standard errors when estimating the variance in
order to control for autocorrelation. Our interpretation of the results is consis-
tent with the approach of comparing predictive accuracy of the forecasts, not
models, and thus allows us to use the standard normal limiting distribution (see
Diebold (2015) for a complete discussion comparing the two interpretations).
The DM test statistics are presented for the different forecasts and horizons in
Tables 3.8a - 3.8c for the QLIKE loss function and Tables 3.9a - 3.9c for the
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MSE loss function. A positive statistic indicates that the forecasts from asym-
metric factors (the model listed second in the title of each chart) outperforms
the forecasts from RV or BV (the model listed first in the title of each chart).
We can see that for nearly all horizons and across all comparisons, the fore-
casts generated using asymmetric components tend to outperform the forecasts
generated from only lags of RV and BV . This result provides further evidence
that signed high frequency returns should be included when trying to forecast
volatility.
3.6 Conclusion
By considering the sign of high frequency returns, we find that negative returns
that contribute to the our realized volatility estimator, negative semivariance,
tend to have stronger effects on future volatility than positive returns. Unlike
the results found for the SPDR index in Patton and Sheppard (2015), though,
we do find significant coefficients in front of our positive realized semivariance.
An interesting pattern emerges between the magnitudes of coefficients in front of
positive and negative semivariance when looking over different maturities, with
the magnitude of the negative semivariance coefficient dominating the positive
semivarance as one moves from shorter to longer maturities.
When considering volatility forecasts using our estimated signed jump com-
ponent, we find both positive and negative jumps dampen future volatility,
which is also different than that found in the equities market. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to conclude why these differences exist, but if one believes
that jumps are associated with the market digesting new information, it would
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be worth investigating whether the common prescheduled news announcements
related to macro fundamentals play a role in these discovered differences in
coefficients.
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Figure 3.1a: Weekly Moving Averages for 5-Year Contract
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Figure 3.1b: Weekly Moving Averages for 10-Year Contract
Figure 3.1c: Weekly Moving Averages for 30-Year Contract
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Figure 3.2a: Coefficients on RV and Signed RS for 5-Year Futures Contract
Figure 3.2b: Coefficients on RV and Signed RS for 10-Year Futures Contract
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Figure 3.2c: Coefficients on RV and Signed RS for 30-Year Futures Contract
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Figure 3.3a: Coefficients on Signed ∆J2 for 5-Year Futures Contract
Figure 3.3b: Coefficients on Signed ∆J2 for 10-Year Futures Contract
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Figure 3.3c: Coefficients on Signed ∆J2 for 30-Year Futures Contract
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for All Maturities
Mean St. Dev. Q.25 Median Q.75
5-year RV 0.057 0.085 0.021 0.035 0.063
BV 0.049 0.063 0.019 0.032 0.056
RS+ 0.028 0.050 0.010 0.016 0.031
RS− 0.029 0.054 0.009 0.016 0.030
∆J -0.001 0.060 -0.007 -0.000 0.007
∆J+ 0.009 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.007
∆J− -0.010 0.043 -0.007 -0.000 0.000
10-year RV 0.129 0.176 0.055 0.088 0.149
BV 0.112 0.127 0.049 0.079 0.132
RS+ 0.064 0.114 0.026 0.042 0.072
RS− 0.065 0.102 0.025 0.041 0.072
∆J -0.001 0.125 -0.016 -0.000 0.015
∆J+ 0.019 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.015
∆J− -0.020 0.077 -0.016 -0.000 0.000
30-year RV 0.296 0.363 0.140 0.217 0.349
BV 0.258 0.263 0.122 0.192 0.311
RS+ 0.145 0.242 0.065 0.104 0.168
RS− 0.151 0.194 0.064 0.102 0.173
∆J -0.006 0.247 -0.041 -0.001 0.036
∆J+ 0.039 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.036
∆J− -0.045 0.149 -0.041 -0.001 0.000
Note: All values are scaled by 1000.
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Table 3.2: Correlation Between Measures for All Maturities
RV BV RS+ RS− ∆J ∆J+ ∆J−
5-year RV 1.000 0.918 0.800 0.832 -0.081 0.571 -0.650
BV 0.918 1.000 0.696 0.799 -0.138 0.381 -0.552
RS+ 0.800 0.696 1.000 0.333 0.533 0.909 -0.103
RS− 0.832 0.799 0.333 1.000 -0.621 0.057 -0.927
∆J -0.081 -0.138 0.533 -0.621 1.000 0.704 0.746
∆J+ 0.571 0.381 0.909 0.057 0.704 1.000 0.053
∆J− -0.650 -0.552 -0.103 -0.927 0.746 0.053 1.000
10-year RV 1.000 0.886 0.836 0.792 0.112 0.619 -0.582
BV 0.886 1.000 0.624 0.832 -0.113 0.300 -0.553
RS+ 0.836 0.624 1.000 0.328 0.639 0.915 -0.090
RS− 0.792 0.832 0.328 1.000 -0.517 0.048 -0.902
∆J 0.112 -0.113 0.639 -0.517 1.000 0.790 0.653
∆J+ 0.619 0.300 0.915 0.048 0.790 1.000 0.051
∆J− -0.582 -0.553 -0.090 -0.902 0.653 0.051 1.000
30-year RV 1.000 0.932 0.868 0.786 0.233 0.708 -0.504
BV 0.932 1.000 0.768 0.785 0.136 0.540 -0.455
RS+ 0.868 0.768 1.000 0.376 0.685 0.938 -0.045
RS− 0.786 0.785 0.376 1.000 -0.418 0.154 -0.886
∆J 0.233 0.136 0.685 -0.418 1.000 0.798 0.652
∆J+ 0.708 0.540 0.938 0.154 0.798 1.000 0.063
∆J− -0.504 -0.455 -0.045 -0.886 0.652 0.063 1.000
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d βI βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.087 0.202 0.405 0.080
(0.020) (0.031) (0.045)
0.097 0.079 0.203 0.405 0.080
(0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.045)
0.098 0.076 0.002 0.203 0.405 0.080
(0.036) (0.076) (0.053) (0.031) (0.045)
h = 5 0.063 0.191 0.426 0.240
(0.013) (0.030) (0.043)
0.066 0.060 0.191 0.426 0.240
(0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.043)
0.064 0.074 -0.011 0.190 0.426 0.240
(0.021) (0.040) (0.028) (0.030) (0.043)
h = 22 0.048 0.169 0.360 0.342
(0.011) (0.027) (0.039)
0.052 0.044 0.169 0.360 0.342
(0.018) (0.015) (0.027) (0.039)
0.050 0.060 -0.013 0.169 0.360 0.342
(0.018) (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) (0.039)
h = 66 0.035 0.119 0.315 0.325
(0.006) (0.016) (0.044)
0.042 0.028 0.119 0.315 0.325
(0.012) (0.008) (0.016) (0.044)
0.038 0.050 -0.018 0.119 0.315 0.325
(0.013) (0.025) (0.020) (0.016) (0.044)
Note: The first line for each value of h corresponds to the results from estimating
equation 3.17, the second line corresponds to equation 3.18, the third line corresponds
to equation 3.19. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses with bandwidth
selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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d βI βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.079 0.227 0.394 0.082
(0.024) (0.046) (0.057)
0.055 0.109 0.226 0.393 0.082
(0.033) (0.039) (0.047) (0.056)
0.061 0.071 0.031 0.227 0.393 0.083
(0.035) (0.068) (0.046) (0.047) (0.056)
h = 5 0.067 0.185 0.428 0.241
(0.017) (0.037) (0.056)
0.047 0.092 0.184 0.427 0.242
(0.026) (0.027) (0.038) (0.055)
0.045 0.101 -0.007 0.184 0.427 0.242
(0.029) (0.056) (0.035) (0.038) (0.055)
h = 22 0.047 0.161 0.389 0.363
(0.011) (0.030) (0.047)
0.032 0.064 0.161 0.388 0.363
(0.020) (0.021) (0.030) (0.047)
0.032 0.063 0.001 0.161 0.388 0.363
(0.022) (0.039) (0.022) (0.031) (0.047)
h = 66 0.037 0.126 0.347 0.363
(0.008) (0.022) (0.053)
0.033 0.041 0.126 0.347 0.363
(0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.053)
0.031 0.055 -0.011 0.126 0.347 0.363
(0.018) (0.033) (0.018) (0.022) (0.053)
Note: The first line for each value of h corresponds to the results from estimating
equation 3.17, the second line corresponds to equation 3.18, the third line corresponds
to equation 3.19. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses with bandwidth
selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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d βI βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.081 0.223 0.431 0.097
(0.031) (0.063) (0.093)
0.046 0.130 0.222 0.427 0.098
(0.048) (0.045) (0.063) (0.089)
0.064 0.047 0.064 0.222 0.429 0.099
(0.043) (0.067) (0.046) (0.064) (0.090)
h = 5 0.067 0.181 0.470 0.281
(0.025) (0.055) (0.096)
0.041 0.103 0.180 0.467 0.282
(0.036) (0.032) (0.056) (0.094)
0.038 0.118 -0.012 0.179 0.467 0.282
(0.041) (0.062) (0.036) (0.056) (0.093)
h = 22 0.047 0.160 0.456 0.438
(0.015) (0.042) (0.079)
0.024 0.079 0.159 0.454 0.440
(0.026) (0.030) (0.043) (0.079)
0.025 0.074 0.004 0.159 0.454 0.440
(0.029) (0.044) (0.018) (0.043) (0.079)
h = 66 0.037 0.131 0.410 0.441
(0.009) (0.026) (0.062)
0.023 0.057 0.131 0.408 0.442
(0.019) (0.025) (0.027) (0.062)
0.024 0.052 0.004 0.131 0.408 0.442
(0.022) (0.039) (0.016) (0.027) (0.062)
Note: The first line for each value of h corresponds to the results from estimating
equation 3.17, the second line corresponds to equation 3.18, the third line corresponds
to equation 3.19. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses with bandwidth
selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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J βB βw βm R
2
h = 1 RV 0.146 0.187 0.388 0.083
(0.030) (0.029) (0.045)
RV 0.021 0.149 0.187 0.387 0.083
(0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.045)
RV -0.085 0.134 0.223 0.170 0.375 0.086
(0.050) (0.034) (0.046) (0.028) (0.045)
BV 0.015 0.159 0.181 0.327 0.132
(0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.038)
h = 5 RV 0.105 0.180 0.414 0.246
(0.022) (0.028) (0.043)
RV 0.011 0.107 0.179 0.413 0.246
(0.013) (0.021) (0.028) (0.043)
RV -0.065 0.092 0.159 0.167 0.405 0.251
(0.025) (0.023) (0.032) (0.028) (0.043)
BV 0.010 0.110 0.163 0.357 0.300
(0.013) (0.020) (0.025) (0.037)
h = 22 RV 0.079 0.161 0.351 0.348
(0.019) (0.025) (0.040)
RV 0.010 0.081 0.160 0.350 0.349
(0.011) (0.018) (0.025) (0.040)
RV -0.042 0.067 0.117 0.152 0.345 0.353
(0.023) (0.021) (0.029) (0.024) (0.041)
BV 0.013 0.079 0.142 0.308 0.366
(0.011) (0.017) (0.023) (0.032)
h = 66 RV 0.058 0.113 0.308 0.330
(0.011) (0.015) (0.044)
RV 0.011 0.060 0.112 0.307 0.331
(0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.043)
RV -0.032 0.056 0.090 0.106 0.303 0.335
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.043)
BV 0.013 0.058 0.100 0.260 0.317
(0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.039)
Note: The first line for each value of h corresponds to the results from estimating
equation 3.20, the second line corresponds to equation 3.21, the third line corresponds to
3.22, and the fourth from equation 3.23. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses
with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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J βB βw βm R
2
h = 1 RV 0.152 0.209 0.371 0.087
(0.035) (0.045) (0.053)
RV 0.003 0.152 0.209 0.371 0.087
(0.022) (0.034) (0.045) (0.053)
RV -0.064 0.120 0.212 0.195 0.362 0.089
(0.024) (0.043) (0.048) (0.046) (0.052)
BV 0.005 0.161 0.195 0.316 0.145
(0.020) (0.033) (0.041) (0.040)
h = 5 RV 0.127 0.170 0.409 0.251
(0.023) (0.036) (0.053)
RV 0.002 0.127 0.170 0.409 0.251
(0.016) (0.022) (0.036) (0.053)
RV -0.059 0.109 0.181 0.158 0.401 0.257
(0.016) (0.033) (0.030) (0.035) (0.051)
BV 0.001 0.126 0.160 0.351 0.316
(0.015) (0.021) (0.035) (0.041)
h = 22 RV 0.090 0.150 0.375 0.373
(0.019) (0.030) (0.046)
RV 0.002 0.091 0.150 0.375 0.373
(0.013) (0.018) (0.029) (0.046)
RV -0.043 0.081 0.131 0.141 0.369 0.379
(0.009) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.045)
BV 0.005 0.089 0.137 0.318 0.381
(0.013) (0.017) (0.028) (0.040)
h = 66 RV 0.072 0.117 0.335 0.371
(0.017) (0.021) (0.050)
RV 0.011 0.073 0.117 0.335 0.372
(0.010) (0.016) (0.020) (0.050)
RV -0.030 0.085 0.114 0.108 0.327 0.379
(0.007) (0.025) (0.024) (0.019) (0.048)
BV 0.012 0.069 0.103 0.268 0.332
(0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.044)
Note: The first line for each value of h corresponds to the results from estimating
equation 3.20, the second line corresponds to equation 3.21, the third line corresponds to
3.22, and the fourth from equation 3.23. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses
with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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J βB βw βm R
2
h = 1 RV 0.161 0.203 0.400 0.103
(0.041) (0.056) (0.091)
RV -0.036 0.167 0.202 0.397 0.103
(0.045) (0.033) (0.057) (0.086)
RV -0.182 0.148 0.283 0.178 0.372 0.108
(0.047) (0.036) (0.039) (0.054) (0.078)
BV -0.030 0.175 0.195 0.350 0.178
(0.042) (0.033) (0.058) (0.069)
h = 5 RV 0.131 0.165 0.445 0.291
(0.031) (0.050) (0.093)
RV -0.026 0.135 0.164 0.443 0.292
(0.033) (0.026) (0.051) (0.091)
RV -0.157 0.139 0.239 0.142 0.420 0.304
(0.042) (0.039) (0.036) (0.049) (0.083)
BV -0.026 0.136 0.159 0.396 0.377
(0.033) (0.026) (0.050) (0.073)
h = 22 RV 0.095 0.148 0.437 0.450
(0.018) (0.039) (0.077)
RV -0.024 0.099 0.147 0.435 0.451
(0.029) (0.018) (0.041) (0.077)
RV -0.128 0.105 0.181 0.130 0.417 0.465
(0.047) (0.034) (0.042) (0.041) (0.076)
BV -0.021 0.098 0.140 0.387 0.469
(0.028) (0.017) (0.039) (0.070)
h = 66 RV 0.077 0.122 0.393 0.452
(0.014) (0.024) (0.059)
RV -0.014 0.079 0.122 0.392 0.452
(0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.058)
RV -0.103 0.097 0.150 0.107 0.376 0.466
(0.038) (0.031) (0.038) (0.024) (0.055)
BV -0.012 0.076 0.113 0.340 0.424
(0.022) (0.015) (0.025) (0.052)
Note: The first line for each value of h corresponds to the results from estimating
equation 3.20, the second line corresponds to equation 3.21, the third line corresponds to
3.22, and the fourth from equation 3.23. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses
with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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Table 3.5a: HAR Estimation for 5-Year with Alternative Definition of Jump
βd βJ βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.168 -0.243 0.179 0.383 0.134
(0.037) (0.078) (0.029) (0.045)
h = 5 0.124 -0.184 0.173 0.409 0.304
(0.027) (0.048) (0.028) (0.043)
h = 22 0.095 -0.141 0.155 0.347 0.370
(0.024) (0.044) (0.024) (0.041)
h = 66 0.070 -0.106 0.109 0.305 0.320
(0.016) (0.031) (0.014) (0.044)
Note: Jumps are defined according to a ratio-statistic method
(see Tauchen and Zhou (2011) equation (8)), where we set the
significance level to be α = .01. Newey-West standard errors
are in parentheses with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8
(h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
Table 3.5b: HAR Estimation for 10-Year with Alternative Definition of Jump
βd βJ βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.158 -0.214 0.205 0.369 0.145
(0.037) (0.054) (0.045) (0.053)
h = 5 0.129 -0.168 0.168 0.408 0.317
(0.025) (0.035) (0.036) (0.053)
h = 22 0.096 -0.133 0.147 0.373 0.384
(0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.046)
h = 66 0.075 -0.099 0.116 0.334 0.332
(0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.050)
Note: Jumps are defined according to a ratio-statistic method
(see Tauchen and Zhou (2011) equation (8)), where we set the
significance level to be α = .01. Newey-West standard errors
are in parentheses with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8
(h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
119
Table 3.5c: HAR Estimation for 30-Year with Alternative Definition of Jump
βd βJ βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.232 -0.436 0.184 0.372 0.188
(0.035) (0.081) (0.054) (0.077)
h = 5 0.173 -0.306 0.153 0.428 0.387
(0.026) (0.062) (0.050) (0.086)
h = 22 0.135 -0.256 0.137 0.421 0.482
(0.029) (0.073) (0.041) (0.077)
h = 66 0.108 -0.202 0.114 0.381 0.435
(0.027) (0.063) (0.025) (0.056)
Note: Jumps are defined according to a ratio-statistic method
(see Tauchen and Zhou (2011) equation (8)), where we set the
significance level to be α = .01. Newey-West standard errors
are in parentheses with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8
(h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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d βI βIV βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.051 0.965 0.084 0.009 0.110
(0.018) (0.109) (0.030) (0.055)
0.067 0.037 0.966 0.083 0.008 0.110
(0.032) (0.027) (0.109) (0.030) (0.055)
0.070 0.016 0.017 0.967 0.083 0.008 0.110
(0.032) (0.074) (0.053) (0.109) (0.030) (0.054)
h = 5 0.035 0.737 0.100 0.123 0.298
(0.012) (0.085) (0.030) (0.050)
0.043 0.029 0.738 0.100 0.122 0.298
(0.018) (0.016) (0.085) (0.030) (0.050)
0.043 0.028 0.001 0.738 0.100 0.122 0.298
(0.019) (0.036) (0.027) (0.085) (0.030) (0.050)
h = 22 0.027 0.538 0.102 0.139 0.403
(0.011) (0.092) (0.028) (0.058)
0.035 0.020 0.539 0.102 0.138 0.403
(0.017) (0.012) (0.092) (0.028) (0.058)
0.035 0.026 -0.005 0.539 0.102 0.138 0.403
(0.017) (0.023) (0.016) (0.091) (0.028) (0.058)
h = 66 0.022 0.340 0.077 0.175 0.360
(0.007) (0.094) (0.019) (0.060)
0.031 0.014 0.341 0.077 0.174 0.361
(0.011) (0.007) (0.094) (0.019) (0.060)
0.028 0.029 -0.013 0.340 0.077 0.175 0.361
(0.012) (0.023) (0.020) (0.094) (0.019) (0.059)
Note: This table uses the same equations as those outlined in Tables 3.3a-3.3c with
the addition of the MOVE index. We scale to move index by dividing it by 107 in
order to have it on the same order of magnitude as RV . Newey-West standard errors
are in parentheses with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and
130 (h = 66).
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d βI βIV βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.036 2.236 0.085 -0.045 0.118
(0.017) (0.206) (0.038) (0.043)
0.029 0.044 2.232 0.085 -0.044 0.118
(0.023) (0.030) (0.203) (0.038) (0.043)
0.033 0.016 0.023 2.230 0.086 -0.044 0.118
(0.023) (0.058) (0.042) (0.203) (0.038) (0.043)
h = 5 0.031 1.861 0.067 0.063 0.322
(0.013) (0.179) (0.026) (0.042)
0.025 0.039 1.857 0.067 0.063 0.322
(0.018) (0.020) (0.177) (0.026) (0.042)
0.022 0.056 -0.014 1.857 0.067 0.063 0.322
(0.019) (0.045) (0.031) (0.177) (0.026) (0.042)
h = 22 0.017 1.510 0.065 0.092 0.467
(0.009) (0.228) (0.026) (0.053)
0.015 0.020 1.508 0.065 0.092 0.468
(0.015) (0.012) (0.224) (0.026) (0.053)
0.014 0.025 -0.004 1.508 0.065 0.092 0.468
(0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.224) (0.026) (0.053)
h = 66 0.014 1.118 0.052 0.120 0.438
(0.007) (0.199) (0.018) (0.044)
0.018 0.009 1.120 0.052 0.120 0.438
(0.012) (0.008) (0.199) (0.018) (0.045)
0.017 0.014 -0.004 1.120 0.052 0.120 0.438
(0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.199) (0.018) (0.045)
Note: This table uses the same equations as those outlined in Tables 3.3a-3.3c with
the addition of the MOVE index. We scale to move index by dividing it by 107 in
order to have it on the same order of magnitude as RV . Newey-West standard errors
are in parentheses with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and
130 (h = 66).
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d βI βIV βw βm R
2
h = 1 0.049 3.499 0.126 0.141 0.123
(0.020) (0.336) (0.037) (0.062)
0.034 0.071 3.473 0.127 0.142 0.123
(0.033) (0.036) (0.331) (0.037) (0.062)
0.051 -0.005 0.059 3.468 0.127 0.143 0.124
(0.028) (0.061) (0.046) (0.330) (0.038) (0.063)
h = 5 0.040 2.995 0.098 0.221 0.340
(0.017) (0.355) (0.032) (0.069)
0.031 0.054 2.979 0.098 0.222 0.340
(0.024) (0.023) (0.348) (0.032) (0.070)
0.027 0.074 -0.016 2.981 0.097 0.221 0.340
(0.029) (0.052) (0.034) (0.348) (0.031) (0.069)
h = 22 0.024 2.521 0.090 0.243 0.515
(0.013) (0.594) (0.036) (0.072)
0.015 0.037 2.505 0.090 0.243 0.515
(0.019) (0.016) (0.578) (0.036) (0.072)
0.015 0.037 0.000 2.505 0.090 0.243 0.515
(0.021) (0.026) (0.015) (0.579) (0.036) (0.072)
h = 66 0.018 2.138 0.071 0.227 0.515
(0.007) (0.559) (0.020) (0.044)
0.016 0.021 2.135 0.071 0.227 0.515
(0.013) (0.012) (0.554) (0.020) (0.045)
0.016 0.019 0.002 2.134 0.071 0.227 0.515
(0.015) (0.021) (0.014) (0.554) (0.020) (0.045)
Note: This table uses the same equations as those outlined in Tables 3.3a-3.3c with
the addition of the MOVE index. We scale to move index by dividing it by 107 in
order to have it on the same order of magnitude as RV . Newey-West standard errors
are in parentheses with bandwidth selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and
130 (h = 66).
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J βIV βB βw βm R
2
h = 1 RV 0.940 0.089 0.077 0.008 0.112
(0.109) (0.028) (0.029) (0.054)
RV 0.022 0.941 0.092 0.077 0.007 0.112
(0.022) (0.109) (0.027) (0.029) (0.054)
RV -0.059 0.109 0.924 0.150 0.066 0.005 0.113
(0.049) (0.033) (0.110) (0.044) (0.028) (0.054)
BV 0.016 0.756 0.113 0.093 0.021 0.166
(0.022) (0.086) (0.026) (0.025) (0.045)
h = 5 RV 0.720 0.061 0.095 0.122 0.300
(0.084) (0.019) (0.029) (0.050)
RV 0.012 0.720 0.063 0.095 0.122 0.300
(0.011) (0.084) (0.019) (0.029) (0.050)
RV -0.045 0.073 0.709 0.103 0.087 0.120 0.303
(0.023) (0.020) (0.082) (0.029) (0.028) (0.050)
BV 0.011 0.596 0.074 0.093 0.116 0.355
(0.011) (0.064) (0.018) (0.024) (0.041)
h = 22 RV 0.525 0.047 0.099 0.138 0.405
(0.090) (0.017) (0.027) (0.058)
RV 0.011 0.526 0.049 0.099 0.138 0.406
(0.009) (0.090) (0.017) (0.027) (0.058)
RV -0.028 0.053 0.518 0.076 0.093 0.137 0.408
(0.021) (0.019) (0.088) (0.026) (0.026) (0.058)
BV 0.013 0.448 0.052 0.089 0.126 0.420
(0.009) (0.072) (0.015) (0.023) (0.047)
h = 66 RV 0.329 0.038 0.074 0.175 0.363
(0.094) (0.011) (0.018) (0.059)
RV 0.012 0.329 0.040 0.074 0.174 0.363
(0.006) (0.094) (0.012) (0.018) (0.059)
RV -0.023 0.048 0.322 0.064 0.069 0.173 0.366
(0.015) (0.015) (0.094) (0.019) (0.018) (0.059)
BV 0.013 0.293 0.040 0.065 0.141 0.349
(0.007) (0.087) (0.011) (0.017) (0.049)
Note: This table uses the same equations as those outlined in Tables 3.4a-3.4c with the addition
of the MOVE index. We scale to move index by dividing it by 107 in order to have it on the
same order of magnitude as RV . Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses with bandwidth
selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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J βIV βB βw βm R
2
h = 1 RV 2.162 0.079 0.080 -0.044 0.120
(0.196) (0.026) (0.037) (0.042)
RV 0.007 2.163 0.080 0.079 -0.045 0.120
(0.018) (0.196) (0.026) (0.037) (0.042)
RV -0.044 0.095 2.137 0.126 0.071 -0.047 0.121
(0.021) (0.032) (0.191) (0.036) (0.038) (0.042)
BV 0.008 1.747 0.102 0.091 -0.019 0.186
(0.017) (0.153) (0.026) (0.032) (0.036)
h = 5 RV 1.802 0.066 0.062 0.063 0.325
(0.173) (0.018) (0.025) (0.041)
RV 0.005 1.803 0.067 0.062 0.063 0.325
(0.012) (0.172) (0.018) (0.025) (0.042)
RV -0.042 0.089 1.778 0.110 0.054 0.061 0.328
(0.014) (0.023) (0.168) (0.023) (0.024) (0.041)
BV 0.003 1.468 0.077 0.072 0.069 0.391
(0.012) (0.143) (0.017) (0.025) (0.037)
h = 22 RV 1.469 0.041 0.062 0.093 0.470
(0.216) (0.012) (0.025) (0.052)
RV 0.004 1.470 0.041 0.062 0.092 0.470
(0.011) (0.216) (0.012) (0.025) (0.052)
RV -0.030 0.064 1.452 0.072 0.056 0.091 0.474
(0.008) (0.019) (0.210) (0.017) (0.024) (0.052)
BV 0.007 1.217 0.048 0.064 0.084 0.468
(0.011) (0.174) (0.012) (0.023) (0.049)
h = 66 RV 1.084 0.032 0.050 0.121 0.440
(0.199) (0.012) (0.018) (0.044)
RV 0.011 1.084 0.034 0.049 0.120 0.441
(0.008) (0.198) (0.012) (0.017) (0.044)
RV -0.019 0.065 1.061 0.064 0.044 0.119 0.444
(0.007) (0.019) (0.196) (0.018) (0.016) (0.044)
BV 0.012 0.937 0.035 0.045 0.082 0.396
(0.009) (0.186) (0.011) (0.016) (0.040)
Note: This table uses the same equations as those outlined in Tables 3.4a-3.4c with the addition
of the MOVE index. We scale to move index by dividing it by 107 in order to have it on the
same order of magnitude as RV . Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses with bandwidth
selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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J βIV βB βw βm R
2
h = 1 RV 3.327 0.106 0.117 0.134 0.126
(0.339) (0.032) (0.034) (0.061)
RV -0.017 3.306 0.109 0.118 0.134 0.126
(0.034) (0.331) (0.028) (0.034) (0.061)
RV -0.123 0.115 3.162 0.195 0.104 0.127 0.128
(0.037) (0.031) (0.308) (0.035) (0.031) (0.059)
BV -0.014 2.875 0.125 0.121 0.122 0.210
(0.032) (0.301) (0.029) (0.037) (0.043)
h = 5 RV 2.865 0.083 0.091 0.216 0.344
(0.352) (0.024) (0.029) (0.069)
RV -0.009 2.853 0.085 0.091 0.216 0.344
(0.022) (0.344) (0.022) (0.029) (0.069)
RV -0.106 0.110 2.722 0.163 0.078 0.210 0.351
(0.030) (0.032) (0.320) (0.030) (0.027) (0.066)
BV -0.011 2.509 0.093 0.095 0.196 0.436
(0.024) (0.316) (0.023) (0.031) (0.051)
h = 22 RV 2.424 0.055 0.085 0.239 0.519
(0.587) (0.017) (0.033) (0.071)
RV -0.011 2.410 0.057 0.086 0.239 0.520
(0.018) (0.567) (0.015) (0.034) (0.071)
RV -0.086 0.081 2.309 0.118 0.076 0.234 0.527
(0.027) (0.021) (0.521) (0.024) (0.033) (0.070)
BV -0.009 2.216 0.059 0.083 0.207 0.540
(0.018) (0.522) (0.015) (0.032) (0.064)
h = 66 RV 2.061 0.042 0.067 0.224 0.518
(0.552) (0.012) (0.019) (0.044)
RV -0.003 2.057 0.042 0.067 0.224 0.518
(0.014) (0.545) (0.011) (0.019) (0.044)
RV -0.065 0.075 1.966 0.094 0.060 0.221 0.524
(0.020) (0.017) (0.512) (0.019) (0.018) (0.043)
BV -0.001 1.908 0.042 0.062 0.184 0.491
(0.013) (0.544) (0.011) (0.018) (0.038)
Note: This table uses the same equations as those outlined in Tables 3.4a-3.4c with the addition
of the MOVE index. We scale to move index by dividing it by 107 in order to have it on the
same order of magnitude as RV . Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses with bandwidth
selections of 5 (h = 1), 8 (h = 5), 42 (h = 22), and 130 (h = 66).
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Table 3.8a: DM Statistic: HAR-RV vs HAR-RS QLIKE
5-year 10-year 30-year
h = 1 1.372 2.257 0.861
h = 5 1.662 3.866 2.254
h = 22 1.438 4.197 2.180
h = 66 2.014 4.763 3.233
Table 3.8b: DM Statistic: HAR-BV vs HAR-∆J2± QLIKE
5-year 10-year 30-year
h = 1 2.883 3.540 2.253
h = 5 3.107 3.343 1.295
h = 22 3.348 4.548 0.314
h = 66 4.750 5.393 2.372
Table 3.8c: DM Statistic: HAR-RV vs HAR-∆J2± QLIKE
5-year 10-year 30-year
h = 1 4.429 4.141 2.567
h = 5 5.058 3.956 1.927
h = 22 6.405 5.048 2.124
h = 66 8.102 6.127 3.937
Note: These tables present test statistics
under the null hypothesis that the forecasts
have equal predictive power. We use Newey-
West standard errors when calculating the
test statistic to control for autocorrelation in
the forecasting errors. The DM test statis-
tic has a standard normal limiting distribu-
tion, with a positive test statistic indicating
the second model listed outperforms the first
model listed.
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Table 3.9a: DM Statistic: HAR-RV vs HAR-RS MSE
5-year 10-year 30-year
h = 1 0.869 1.423 0.606
h = 5 1.014 2.864 1.535
h = 22 0.804 3.425 1.651
h = 66 1.673 4.282 2.724
Table 3.9b: DM Statistic: HAR-BV vs HAR-∆J2± MSE
5-year 10-year 30-year
h = 1 2.083 1.788 0.420
h = 5 2.373 2.102 -0.029
h = 22 2.275 3.337 -0.256
h = 66 4.022 4.559 1.153
Table 3.9c: DM Statistic: HAR-RV vs HAR-∆J2± MSE
5-year 10-year 30-year
h = 1 3.213 2.159 0.796
h = 5 3.852 2.388 0.438
h = 22 4.811 3.534 0.747
h = 66 6.941 5.021 2.334
Note: These tables present test statistics
under the null hypothesis that the forecasts
have equal predictive power. We use Newey-
West standard errors when calculating the
test statistic to control for autocorrelation in
the forecasting errors. The DM test statis-
tic has a standard normal limiting distribu-
tion, with a positive test statistic indicating
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Bid Function for Procurement Auction with
Warranty
We consider the expected profit function of player i:
E[πi|c1i] = (bi − c1i(1 + ei)− ProbCA(ei)δµc)Pr(bi < b−i)
where −i represents all other bidders. As a reminder, c2i is a second draw
made in the future if one needs to do corrective action, and since players are
bidding based on expected costs it will be treated as a constant, µc, under the
further assumption that both c1i and c2i are independently drawn from the same
distribution. ei is the extra effort of the project. I will assume that the extra
effort choice is binary, ei ∈ {0, ē}.
Thus a player’s expected costs when she chooses ei = 0 are c1i+ProbCA(ei =
0)δµc and a player’s costs when choosing high effort are c1i(1+ē)+ProbCA(ei =
ē)δµc. The player can solve the maximization with respect to ei while ab-
stracting away from the choice of bi. A player will choose their optimal effort




0 if c1i(1 + ē)− c1i > ProbCA(ei = 0)δµc
ē otherwise
I will refer to the following object as the cutoff point where players are
indifferent between the effort choices:
c∗ ≡ (ProbCA(ei = 0)δµc
ē
. (A.1)
Assuming other bidders use an invertible bid function in equilibrium, I can
rewrite the expected profit function as:
E[πi|c1i] = (bi − c1i(1 + ei)− ProbCA(ei)δµc)Pr(bi < β(c−1i))
= (bi − c1i(1 + ei)− ProbCA(ei)δµc)[1− F (β−1(bi))]n−1







Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, I can substitute c1i for β
−1(bi) and β(c1i)













[1− F (c1i)]n−1β′(c1i) + β(c1i)(n− 1)[1− F (c1i)]n−2(−f(c1i)) =
(c1i(1 + ei) + ProbCA(ei)δµc)(n− 1)[1− F (c1i)]n−2(−f(c1i)) (A.2)




= (c1i(1 + ei) + ProbCA(ei)δµc)(n− 1)[1− F (c1i)]n−2(−f(c1i))
Integrating both sides (with the RHS using integration by parts) and imposing
the boundary condition that β(c̄) = c̄ + ProbCA(ei = 0)δµc, because I assume
a nondegenerate case such that there exists some part of the distribution of c1i
such that ei = 0 is realized:
[1− F (c1i)]n−1β(c1i) = (c1i(1 + ei) + ProbCA(ei)δµc)[1− F (c1i)]n−1 +
∫ c̄
c1i
(1 + ei)[1− F (x)]n−1dx (A.3)
Dividing both sides by [1−F (c1i)]n−1 gives me the familiar equation that shows
the bid as an additive function of the signal and some markdown term:







This function applies to all costs such that c1i > c
∗, which means I am also able
to make the following substitution in terms of effort selection:





for c1i > c
∗
(A.5)
Next, consider equation A.2 where we know the solution at β(c∗) is con-
tinuous, due to the continuity of total expected costs. Recall that if c1i < c
∗,
bidders choose ei = ē. Thus, the solution gives:













for c1i < c
∗
Furthermore, if we impose the assumption put forth in the paper that high
effort work is related to the case where contractors guarantee they do not have
to undertake higher effort work (ProbCA(ei = ē) = 0), the equation simplifies
to:












for c1i < c
∗
Taken together, the full equilibrium bid function is defined as:





for c1i > c
∗
(A.8)











for c1i < c
∗
A.2 Identification of Effort and Probability of
Corrective Action
Next, let me define the percentage of all warranty auctions needing corrective
action as:
ProbCAn = ProbCA(ei = 0) ∗ (1−Hn(c∗)) (A.9)
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where Hn() represents the the distribution of winning bids, since I only observe
the winners needing to undertake corrective action. Due to the monotonicity of
the bid function, this is an ordered statistic and the same as the distribution of
the lowest cost. I use subscript n to emphasize the dependence of this ordered
statistic on the total number of bidders. I specifically look at 1−Hn(c∗) because
that is the fraction of winning bidders who choose to exert no extra effort.
Under the assumption that I observe auctions where the number of bidders
are not the same. I call two arbitrary number of bidders in different auctions
n1 and n2 for convenience. This allows me to identify the remaining terms from
the new data. To see this, I consider the following two equations:
ProbCAn1 = ProbCA(ei = 0) ∗ (1−Hn1(c∗)) (A.10)
and
ProbCAn2 = ProbCA(ei = 0) ∗ (1−Hn2(c∗)) (A.11)
Recall, Hn1(c
∗) represents the probability that the winner’s cost draw is less
than c∗ in the case that n = n1. This is the same as 1 minus the probability that
the winner’s cost draw is greater than c∗ in the case that n = n1. With i.i.d.
draws and monotonic bid functions, as I have in my setting, the probability that
the winner’s cost draw is greater than c∗ is the same as saying the probability
that all bidders’ cost draws are greater than c∗, or [1− F (c∗)]n1 . making these
substitutions:
ProbCAn1 = ProbCA(ei = 0) ∗ (1− [1− [1− F (c∗)]n1 ])
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which simplifies to
ProbCAn1 = ProbCA(ei = 0) ∗ [1− F (c∗)]n1
Similarly,
ProbCAn2 = ProbCA(ei = 0) ∗ [1− F (c∗)]n2 (A.12)






This in turn simplifies to
ProbCAn1
ProbCAn2
= [1− F (c∗)]n1−n2
The left hand side of this equation is just some constant that comes from the
data, and the RHS is monotonic in c∗, thus uniquely identifying that value. With
the proper c∗ pinned down, any of the corrective action equations, say equation
A.10, determine ProbCA(ei = 0) since all other elements in the equation are
known. Similarly, with ProbCA(ei = 0) determined, ēi is uniquely determined
given that c∗ and µc are known from:
c∗ ≡ (ProbCA(ei = 0)δµc
ē
. (A.13)
A.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
I include this brief simulation exercise to demonstrate the properties of my es-
timator. I consider auctions with n = 2, 3, and 4. This simulation assumes
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L = 200 and goes through 1000 trials. Following the simulation exercise in Li,




4c if 0 ≤ c ≤ .5
4− 4c if .5 < c ≤ 1
Unlike Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002), observed auction heterogeneity is
an important aspect of my estimation and I need to alter these draws in such
a way that I can test the performance of my homogenization procedure. To
do so, I generate two covariates as a simple example. The homogonization
regression, because it is done by OLS, has well known properties that cause
me the least concern for the entire estimation procedure. Table 1.6 summarizes
the results. Figures 1.3a and 1.3b plot nonparametric CDF and pdf estimates
that are performed directly on the (unobservable to the econometrician) cost
draws. I do this to better understand where any estimation error may be coming
from. Next, I complete the full analysis where I use the inverse bid function to
back out pseudocosts. Figures 1.4a and 1.4b plot the results. Lastly, I use 3
moments related to corrective action (one for each n) to estimate the remaining
parameters. My results are displayed in Table 1.7.
A.4 Discussion of δ
My data include a measure of the estimated costs of corrective action, as re-
ported to MDOT by the contractor. Before using these data directly, I was told
by engineers at MDOT that this was a very noisy measure and they did not
believe some of the reported amounts (some of which included $1). Not wanting
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to throw away data that the engineers considered plausible, I used their indus-
try expertise by following suggestions of how to process the data in order to get
the most reliable self-reported value. Upon their suggestion, I first ignored all
reports less than $1000, as the tasks that required corrective action were always
more costly than this.1 I will treat these as random error events.
Next, I divided the remaining reported estimates by the calculated average
expected costs (accounting for covariates) for each auction needing corrective
action. Note that I am able to do this due to the assumption that c1i and c2i are
independently drawn. Lastly, I take the median of all ratios in order to further
prevent unreasonable outliers from overly affecting my estimate. This procedure
leads to a result which matches the basic estimates put forth by the engineers
at MDOT, δ = .08. Similar to how other papers have relied on industry experts
and insight from from testimony (see Genesove and Mullin (1998)) or general
market institutions (see Laffont, Ossard, Vuong, et al. (1995)) in order to pin
down certain parameters, I consider my calculation from self-reported estimates
and conversations with the engineers at MDOT to be the best I can do given
my data limitations.
1One explanation for why there were so many worthless entries was that the internal
computer system used to track projects forced engineers to enter a figure before being able
to close out a project. This led to engineers calling the construction firms at inopportune
times and sometimes getting unreasonable responses from people at the contracting firm who
were unwilling to take the time to accurately account for internal costs. Additionally, it was





B.1 Proofs of Theorems
In this appendix we give brief proofs of our two theorems in the model section.
B.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1.1
The first main equation we have is,∑
Ht








Pr (Dt|D∗t , Dt−1)× E [ω (Ht) |D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1]× Pr (D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2)
according to Assumption 1.1 and 1.2. Similarly,








Pr (Dt|D∗t , Dt−1)× Pr (D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2)
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Then we put the probabilities on both sides into matrix forms. For the first




g5 (1, 1) g5 (1, 0)
g5 (0, 1) g5 (0, 0)
]
where g5 (i, , j) =
∑
Ht
ω (Ht) Pr (Dt = i,Ht, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = j).




g6 (1, 1) g6 (1, 0)
g6 (0, 1) g6 (0, 0)
]
where, g6 (i, j) = Pr(D
∗




g7 (1, 1) g7 (1, 0)
g7 (0, 1) g7 (0, 0)
]








where, E [i] = Eω(Ht)|D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1 [i] = E [ω (Ht) |D
∗
t = i, dt−1, ht−1] ,
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Thus, equation (2.3) is equivalent to
Lω(Ht)(Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2) = LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1 × LD∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2




g8 (1, 1) g8 (1, 0)
g8 (0, 1) g8 (0, 0)
]
where,g8 (i, j) = Pr(Dt = i|D∗t = j, dt−1).
Thus, we are able to rewrite the second main equations as,
LDt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 = LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 × LD∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 .
Given Assumption 1.3 which ensures invertibility of the left-hand side matrix
in equation (2.5), we take the inverse of both sides in this equation and the




× L−1Dt|D∗t ,dt−1 .
Finally, we right-multiply each side of the equation with the corresponding
side in equation(2.4), to get equation (2.6).
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Lω(Ht)(Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2) × L−1Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2
= LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1 × LD∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2×
L−1D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2 × L
−1
Dt|D∗t ,dt−1
= LDt|D∗t ,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,dt−1,ht−1 × L
−1
Dt|D∗t ,dt−1
In the last line of the equation, the RHS matrcies include the misclassifi-
cation error which is of our central interest, and they could be recovered via a
eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition of the LHS matrix. But as we know from
basic matrix arithmetic, the exact position of each eigenvector in the matrix is
not determined. In order to reconcile this problem, we introduce Assumption
1.4 and 1.5 which ensure the most reasonable ordering of eigenvectors from an
economic point of view. Once the order of the columns of eigenvectors is deter-
mined, the misclassification error is uniquely identified and could be estimated.
Therefore, Theorem 1.1 is proved.
B.1.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Following the similar logic as in the previous proof, we firstly write down the












































t−1, Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2, Dt−3
)
.
and the second equality follows from Assumption 2.1 and 2.2. Similarly, we
write down the second main equation as,












Pr(Dt+1, Dt|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1)× Pr(D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1, Ht−2, Dt−2, Dt−3)





g1 (1, 1, 1, 1) g1 (1, 1, 1, 0) g1 (1, 1, 0, 1) g1 (1, 1, 0, 0)
g1 (1, 0, 1, 1) g1 (1, 0, 1, 0) g1 (1, 0, 0, 1) g1 (1, 0, 0, 0)
g1 (0, 1, 1, 1) g1 (0, 1, 1, 0) g1 (0, 1, 0, 1) g1 (0, 1, 0, 0)
g1 (0, 0, 1, 1) g1 (0, 0, 1, 0) g1 (0, 0, 0, 1) g1 (0, 0, 0, 0)

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where g1(i, j, r, k) =
∑
Ht
ω (Ht) Pr (Dt+1 = i,Dt = j,Ht, Dt−1, Ht−1, Dt−2 = r,Dt−3 = k) ,




g2 (1, 1, 1, 1) g2 (1, 1, 1, 0) g2 (1, 1, 0, 1) g2 (1, 1, 0, 0)
g2 (1, 0, 1, 1) g2 (1, 0, 1, 0) g2 (1, 0, 0, 1) g2 (1, 0, 0, 0)
g2 (0, 1, 1, 1) g2 (0, 1, 1, 0) g2 (0, 1, 0, 1) g2 (0, 1, 0, 0)
g2 (0, 0, 1, 1) g2 (0, 0, 1, 0) g2 (0, 0, 0, 1) g2 (0, 0, 0, 0)

where g2(i, j, r, k) = Pr(Dt+1 = i,Dt = j, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = r,Dt−3 = k),for




g3 (1, 1|1, 1) g3 (1, 1|1, 0) g3 (1, 1|0, 1) g3 (1, 1|0, 0)
g3 (1, 0|1, 1) g3 (1, 0|1, 0) g3 (1, 0|0, 1) g3 (1, 0|0, 0)
g3 (0, 1|1, 1) g3 (0, 1|1, 0) g3 (0, 1|0, 1) g3 (0, 1|0, 0)
g3 (0, 0|1, 1) g3 (0, 0|1, 0) g3 (0, 0|0, 1) g3 (0, 0|0, 0)

where g3(i, j|r, k) = Pr(Dt+1 = i,Dt = j|D∗t = r,D∗t−1 = k, dt−1), for any









where, E [i, j] = Eω(Ht)|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1 [i, j] = E
[
ω (Ht) |D∗t = i,D∗t−1 = j, dt−1, ht−1
]
,




g4 (1, 1, 1, 1) g4 (1, 1, 1, 0) g4 (1, 1, 0, 1) g4 (1, 1, 0, 0)
g4 (1, 0, 1, 1) g4 (1, 0, 1, 0) g4 (1, 0, 0, 1) g4 (1, 0, 0, 0)
g4 (0, 1, 1, 1) g4 (0, 1, 1, 0) g4 (0, 1, 0, 1) g4 (0, 1, 0, 0)
g4 (0, 0, 1, 1) g4 (0, 0, 1, 0) g4 (0, 0, 0, 1) g4 (0, 0, 0, 0)

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t−1 = j, dt−1, ht−1, Dt−2 = r,Dt−3 = k), for
any i, j, r, k. Thus, the matrix notation would be written as:
Lω(Ht)(Dt+1,Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3) =LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1
× LD∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3
and corresponding to a degenerated ω (·) = 1
LDt+1,Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3 = LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 × LD∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3
Given Assumption 2.3 which ensures invertibility of the left-hand side matrix







and then we right-multiply each side with the corresponding side in equa-
tion(2.12). Finally, we get equation (2.14).
Lω(Ht)(Dt+1,Dt,Ht,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3) × L−1Dt+1,Dt,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3
=LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1 × LD∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3×
L−1D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1,Dt−2,Dt−3 × L
−1
Dt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1
=LDt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1 ×Dω(Ht)|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1,ht−1 × L
−1
Dt+1,Dt|D∗t ,D∗t−1,dt−1
Similarly as in the basic case, this equation above could help us to recover
the eigenvectors that represents the misclassification errors of our central in-
terest on the right-hand side. in addition, Assumption 2.4 and 2.5 enable us
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to determine the correct ordering of each eigenvector, therefore completes the
proof for Theorem 2.1.
B.2 Simulation: Basic Approach
B.2.1 Data Generation
Data of size N is generated according to the following procedure for 1000 repe-
tition:
Step 1 Generate Dt−1 using the marginal distribution Pr(Dt−1) from the
true data.
Step 2 Conditional on Dt−1 ∈ {0, 1} simultaneously generate (D∗t , Dt−2)
using the joint distribution of Pr(D∗t , Dt−2|Dt−1).
Step 3 Conditional on Dt−1 and D
∗
t , generate Dt using Pr(Dt|D∗t , Dt−1).
Step 4 Generate the health condition data, Ht, using Pr(Ht = 1|D∗t , Dt−1).
In order to get the distribution of Ht, it is better to assume it takes on bi-
nary values. This is because only E [Ht|D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1] can be identified using
our current method. Therefore a binary Ht could give us accurate estimation
of Pr(Ht|D∗t , Dt−1, Ht−1). In our real estimation, Ht takes four possible values,
(1, 2.5, 4, 5). To get the parameters for simulation, we assume Hτ = 0 if Hτ ≤ 3
originally and 1 otherwise.
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Thus we have a data set containing information about (Ht, Ht−1, Dt, D
∗
t , Dt−1,Dt−2).
We use our identification method to estimate Pr(Dt|D∗t , Dt−1) and compare the
results with the underlying true values.
B.2.2 Parametrization
The underlying parameter values now are given in the following equations and
tables:
Pr(D∗t = 1) = 0.5000,Pr(Dt−1 = 1) = 0.5000
Pr(D∗t = 1|D∗t−1 = 1) = 0.5000,Pr(D∗t = 1|D∗t−1 = 0) = 0.5000
Table B.1: Joint Distribution of f(D∗t , Dt−2|Dt−1)
f(D∗t , Dt−2|Dt−1) Dt−1 = 1 Dt−1 = 0
D∗t = 1, Dt−2 = 1 0.2000 0.3000
D∗t = 1, Dt−2 = 0 0.1000 0.2000
D∗t = 0, Dt−2 = 1 0.1000 0.1000
D∗t = 0, Dt−2 = 0 0.6000 0.4000
Table B.2: Conditional Distribution of Dt and Ht
D∗t = 1 D
∗
t = 0
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , Dt−1 = 1) 0.2000 0.2500
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , Dt−1 = 0) 0.0500 0.1000
E(Ht|D∗t , Ht−1 = 1) 0.6000 0.5000
E(Ht|D∗t , Ht−1 = 0) 0.9000 0.8000
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B.3 Simulation: General Approach
B.3.1 Data Generation
Data of size N is generated according to the following procedure for 1000 repe-
tition1:
Step 1 Generate Dt−1 using the marginal distribution Pr(Dt−1) from the
true data.
Step 2 Conditional onDt−1 ∈ {0, 1}, we use the joint distribution of Pr(D∗t , D∗t−1,
Dt−2, Dt−3|dt−1) to generate simultaneously (D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−2, Dt−3) given dt−1.
Step 3 We use the estimated conditional probability Pr(Dτ |D∗τ , D∗τ−1, Dτ−1)
to generate Dt .
Step 4 Using the conditional distribution of Pr(D∗t+1|D∗t ) we can generate
D∗t+1.
Step 5 Similar to that in step 3, we use the estimated conditional probability
Pr(Dτ |D∗τ , D∗τ−1, Dτ−1) to generate Dt+1 .





τ ∈ {t, t + 1}. This can be achieved by applying the estimated result of
Pr(Hτ |D∗τ , D∗τ−1, Hτ−1).
1The simulation is executed in MATLAB, and can be obtained upon request.
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Ideally the data should be generated as an evolution from past periods to
future ones, as is shown in the following flow chart:
where first a joint distribution of (Ht−4, Dt−4, D
∗
t−4) is assumed, then D
∗
τ
is generated from Pr(D∗τ |D∗τ−1), Dτ is generated from Pr(Dτ |D∗τ , D∗τ−1, Dτ−1),
and Hτ is generated from Pr(Hτ |D∗τ , D∗τ−1, Hτ−1). Yet by using this process, we
cannot effectively control the invertibility of the LHS matrix within a limited
sample size. Therefore we adopt a more direct approach described above, with-
out violating assumptions we made to get nonsingular matrices.
B.3.2 Parametrization
The underlying parameter values are given in the following equations and in
tables:
Pr(D∗t = 1) = 0.5000,Pr(Dt−1 = 1) = 0.5000
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Pr(D∗t = 1|D∗t−1 = 1) = 0.5000,Pr(D∗t = 1|D∗t−1 = 0) = 0.5000
Table B.3: Joint Distribution of f(D∗t , D
∗
t−1, Dt−2, Dt−3|Dt−1 = 1)
Dt−2 = 1, Dt−2 = 1, Dt−2 = 0, Dt−2 = 0,
f(D∗t , D
∗
t−1, Dt−2, Dt−3|Dt−1 = 1) Dt−3 = 1 Dt−3 = 0 Dt−3 = 1 Dt−3 = 0
D∗t = 1, D
∗
t−1 = 1 0.1500 0.0500 0.0250 0.0250
D∗t = 1, D
∗
t−1 = 0 0.0250 0.1750 0.0250 0.0250
D∗t = 0, D
∗
t−1 = 1 0.0250 0.0250 0.1500 0.0500
D∗t = 0, D
∗
t−1 = 0 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 0.1750
Table B.4: Joint Distribution of f(D∗t , D
∗
t−1, Dt−2, Dt−3|Dt−1 = 0)
Dt−2 = 1, Dt−2 = 1, Dt−2 = 0, Dt−2 = 0,
f(D∗t , D
∗
t−1, Dt−2, Dt−3|Dt−1 = 0) Dt−3 = 1 Dt−3 = 0 Dt−3 = 1 Dt−3 = 0
D∗t = 1, D
∗
t−1 = 1 0.1500 0.0500 0.0250 0.0250
D∗t = 1, D
∗
t−1 = 0 0.0250 0.1750 0.0250 0.0250
D∗t = 0, D
∗
t−1 = 1 0.0250 0.0250 0.1500 0.0500
D∗t = 0, D
∗
t−1 = 0 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 0.1750
Table B.5: Conditional Distribution of Dt and Ht
D∗t = 1, D
∗
t = 1, D
∗
t = 0, D
∗
t = 0,
D∗t−1 = 1 D
∗
t−1 = 0 D
∗
t−1 = 1 D
∗
t−1 = 0
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1 = 1) 0.8000 0.1000 0.7000 0.1000
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t , D∗t−1, Dt−1 = 0) 0.6000 0.1000 0.5000 0.0500
E(Ht|D∗t , D∗t−1, Ht−1 = 1) 0.8000 0.5000 0.3000 0.1000
E(Ht|D∗t , D∗t−1, Ht−1 = 0) 0.6000 0.4000 0.2000 0.0500
B.4 An Alternative Way of Dealing with Hτ :
Combining Hτ = 1, 2, 3
B.4.1 Basic Approach
In this section we combine all the samples with at least “good” health conditions
in their surveys answers. Specifically, we redefine Hτ = 2.5 if it originally is 1, 2
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or 3. The results from this second estimation are shown in Table B.6. In
addition, we re-estimate everything conditional on gender covariates, and the
results are presented in Table B.7 and Table B.8. Compared with those in
Section 4, the results here are not very different, except for the estimation for
male subgroup. It can be seen that the point estimates for misclassification
errors are the same for D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1 case and for D
∗
t = 0, Dt−1 = 1
case, which does not make much sense. Nonetheless, the bootstrap means and
medians provide more useful information about this subgroup, using the newly
defined subsample.
Table B.6: Estimation Results: Basic Approach, Combining Hτ = 1, 2 and 3
Estimated probabilities Point Bootstrap Bootstrap Standard
estimation mean median error
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 0.7992 0.8475 0.8394 0.1152
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 0.7100 0.6801 0.6790 0.0930
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 0.1022 0.4159 0.2763 0.3664
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 0.0000 0.0425 0.0218 0.0538
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 2.6325 2.6442 2.6401 0.0364
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 2.6102 2.5971 2.5978 0.0255
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 2.5860 2.5756 2.5828 0.0322
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 2.5631 2.5736 2.5802 0.0218
Pr(D∗t = 1) 0.5555 0.3315 0.2140 0.2591
B.4.2 General Approach
We combine Hτ = 1, 2 and 3 and get the estimation results in Table B.9. The
results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.11. One advantage for this
setup over the previous one can be found from the ninth to the sixteenth row.
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Table B.7: Estimation Results: Basic Approach for Males, Combining Hτ = 1, 2
and 3
Estimated probabilities Point Bootstrap Bootstrap Standard
estimation mean median error
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 0.7443 0.8371 0.8421 0.1360
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 0.7443 0.6583 0.6585 0.1539
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 1.0000 0.4772 0.4102 0.3670
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 0.0817 0.0525 0.0431 0.0642
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 2.6098 2.6316 2.6255 0.0461
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 2.6098 2.5871 2.5892 0.0331
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 2.5371 2.5454 2.5486 0.0353
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 2.5695 2.5615 2.5671 0.0228
Pr(D∗t = 1) 0.1309 0.3049 0.1944 0.2372
E
[
Ht|D∗t , D∗t−1, dt−1, ht−1 = 2.5
]
differ more in this table than in Table 2.11.
This tells us that the estimation results are more reliable than those in Table
2.11 because the eigenvalues have more variation and thus can be better iden-
tified.
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Table B.8: Estimation Results: Basic Approach for Females, Combining Hτ =
1, 2 and 3
Estimated probabilities Point Bootstrap Bootstrap Standard
estimation mean median error
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 0.8666 0.8656 0.8770 0.1219
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 0.6689 0.6587 0.6554 0.1106
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 0.1719 0.3879 0.2553 0.3472
Pr(Dt = 1|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 0.0000 0.0341 0.0151 0.0457
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 1) 2.6724 2.6830 2.6775 0.0679
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 1) 2.6066 2.5981 2.5983 0.0414
E(Ht|D∗t = 1, Dt−1 = 0) 2.6098 2.6158 2.6065 0.0603
E(Ht|D∗t = 0, Dt−1 = 0) 2.5890 2.5810 2.5912 0.0358
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